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FEDERAL DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
UNDER THE BURGER COURT
by
John E. Kennedy* and Paul D. Schoonover**
N 1908 the United States Supreme Court decided in Ex parte Young' that
a federal court could enjoin the Attorney General of Minnesota from carry-
ing out state legislation designed to regulate the railroad industry. In choosing
to recognize this equitable power in the federal trial courts, and in sweeping
aside the various defenses that could be raised in opposition, the Court chose
to pursue the traditional equitable goal of protecting property rights.2 For this
choice the Court paid the price of controversy and inefficiency that is recorded
in the history of the Three-Judge Court Act.' In deciding Ex parte Young, the
Court perhaps did not foresee that it was also laying the theoretical foundation
for one of the most controversial roles of federal courts in the future: interfer-
ence with the functions of state officers and courts by granting declaratory and
injunctive relief to protect civil liberties. The friction-making potentialities4
of this task peaked during the six years following the Court's decision in
Dombrowski v. Pfister." That opinion inspired conscientious counsel to seek
federal injunctive relief whenever their clients were threatened with a state
statute that could be claimed to be vague or overbroad. Such relief was sought
even if state proceedings had begun, and even if there were few evidentiary
facts upon which claims could be made that the state officials were acting in
bad faith or for harassment purposes.6 Thus, because the language in the
Dombrowski opinion was itself necessarily vague and overbroad,7 because
some lower-court attempts to clarify Dombrowski were too generous in grant-
ing injunctive relief,' and, more importantly, because the outlook of the Su-
preme Court itself was shifting, a "limiting construction"' by the Court was
inevitable."
* Ph.B., LL.B., Notre Dame University; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale University. Professor of
Law, Southern Methodist University.
* * B.A., Texas Tech University; J.D., Southern Methodist University.
'209 U.S. 123 (1908).
'See Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 241 (1904); Smith v. Ames, 169 U.S.
466, 516-17 (1898).
328 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970); see Currie, Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional
Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1964).
'See Wisdom, The Prictionmaking, Exacerbating Political Role of Federal Courts, 21
Sw. L.J. 411 (1967).
5380 U.S. 479 (1965).
'See Sedler, The Dombrowski-Type Suit as an Effective Weapon for Social Change:
Reflections fron Without and Within (pts. 1-2), 18 KAN. L. REv. 237, 629 (1970).
'See Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance
of Dom rowski, 48 TEXAs L. REV. 535, 605 (1970).8 See, e.g., the comments of the court in Veen v. Davis, 326 F. Supp. 116, 118 (C.D.
Cal. 1971): "Many Federal courts have been granting rather freely the relief sought by
plaintiffs here, citing and relying upon Dombrowski v. Pfister." "Even a panel of our Ninth
Circuit has precipitously and almost perfunctorily participated in the ill-conceived and un-
seemly Federal blockade of legitimate and good-faith State prosecutions of obscenity.
Id. at n.6. See also note 120 infra, and accompanying text.
'Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 752 (1965) (per curiam) (Black, J., dissenting).
"None of the three Justices who continually joined in the majority opinions of the
Younger series participated in Dombrowski. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
were new members of the Court, and interestingly Justice Black, long a first amendment
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On February 23, 1971, the Court decided six cases" that have a significant
impact upon the broad field of equitable remedies in the federal courts. Al-
though these decisions definitely limit the application of the Dombrowski
doctrine, they may be equally significant for the issues they leave unresolved.'
The lower federal courts have now begun to work with the principles of the
"February sextet,"'" and predictably, are producing uneven patterns of issues,
doctrines, and results across a broad spectrum of demands for equitable pro-
tection of constitutional rights. This Article attempts to define that pattern
as it is emerging under the Burger Court.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MERIT-AVOIDANCE DEVICES
The best known response of Congress to Ex parte Young was the Three-
Judge Court Act. 4 There were also less noticed statutes that withdrew certain
controversies from the jurisdiction of the district courts." Still, the most sig-
nificant limitations upon the exercise of the jurisdiction sanctioned in Ex parte
Young came from the federal courts themselves. Ample grounds for restraint
could be found in the traditional prerequisites to equitable jurisdiction: inade-
quate remedy at law and irreparable injury. In addition to these equitable
principles there was also the traditional principle of maintaining the delicate
balance of federalism-which gave rise to another layer of doctrine justifying
refusals of federal courts to interpose themselves between states and their
citizens. These principles of equity and federalism naturally overlap because
they share a common theoretical basis, and because they serve the same func-
tion, at least superficially, of avoiding the merits of the controversy. Neverthe-
absolutist, authored all six Younger opinions. Of the three Justices still on the Court who
were in the majority in Dombrowski, Justices Brennan and White concurred in the result
in the majority of the Younger series, but dissented in part in Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S.
82 (1971), and Justice Douglas consistently dissented.
"Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971);
Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v.
Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971) (per curiam); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971) (per
curiam).
"See LeFlore v. Robinson, 446 F.2d 715, 716 (5th Cit. 1971) (Goldberg, J., con-
curring).
"Judge Goldberg so named the series of cases. Id. at 718.
1428 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).
"In 1913 Congress provided for a stay of federal injunctive actions if state court en-
forcement proceedings had been instituted and if, pursuant to such proceedings, the opera-
tion of the statute or administrative order had been suspended pending a determination of
constitutionality. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(5) (1970). See Traffic Tel. Workers' Fed'n v. Dris-
coll, 72 F. Supp. 499 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 332 U.S. 833 (1947). See also Hutcheson, A Case
for Three Judges, 47 HARv. L. REv. 795, 822-25 (1934); Pogue, State Determination of
State Law and the Judicial Code, 41 HARV. L. REv. 623 (1928); Comment, Limitation of
Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction Over Public Utility Rate Cases, 44 YALE L.J. 119,
122-24 (1934).
The Johnson Act, now 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1970), provided that in certain circumstances
federal district courts were deprived of jurisdiction to enjoin the operation of or compliance
with rate orders promulgated by state administrative agencies for regulation of public
utilities.
The Tax Injunction Act of 1937, now 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970), prohibits district
courts from enjoining "the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where
a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." In a recent
case the Johnson Act and the Tax Injunction Act, though not technically applicable, were
deemed indicative of a policy against interference with the "domestic" matter of allocation
of state tax revenues to municipalities, and the court abstained. City of East Chicago v.
Whitcomb, Civil No. 71-H-57 (N.D. Ind., Sept. 14, 1971).
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less, the principles have evolved sufficiently to justify categorization for analysis
as (1) exhaustion of state remedies, (2) abstention, and (3) comity. Of
course, since most cases will simultaneously invoke all three concepts and in-
dividual judges have their own notions of what fits where, the categories serve
only to focus the courts on certain concrete factors that ought to be considered
in coming to a judgment about federal intervention.
A. Exhaustion of State Remedies
The requirement of exhausting state remedies is grounded mainly in a desire
to avoid needless friction with the states, but is also supported by considerations
of standing, ripeness, and justiciability." These considerations, based upon the
1case or controversy" requirement" and the grant of judicial power in article
III of the Constitution, 8 unite to dictate the point in time in the development
of a "case" when it is appropriate, if ever, for a federal court to respond to
demands for intervention.
The Supreme Court did not hesitate to impose exhaustion restrictions upon
Ex parte Young by deciding Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co."' in the same
year. Because Virginia had vested its Supreme Court of Appeals with legislative
powers when reviewing rate orders of the Virginia State Corporation Com-
mission, the railroad was met with the exhaustion principle when it sought
injunctive relief in federal court without first appealing to the state appellate
court. The Supreme Court essentially held that the case was not yet ripe since
all legislative remedies had not been exhausted.
The Prentis doctrine is not materially different from the general rule that
state administrative remedies must be exhausted before resort to a federal
court."0 However, the principle that state judicial remedies must also be ex-
hausted differs substantially in that it is not based upon the lack of a justiciable
controversy, but upon considerations of friction-avoidance. This principle has
been legislatively adopted by Congress in at least three situations, including
federal habeas corpus procedure."' Some federal courts, in addition, have en-
grafted such a requirement onto actions brought under the Civil Rights Act
of 1871." But in a series of cases the Supreme Court cast severe doubts upon
'"See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
858 (1953).
17 U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2.
18 1 d. § 1.
19211 U.S. 210 (1908).
'
0 See First Nat'l Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 U.S. 450, 454 (1924); Pacific
Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440 (1916).
2128 U.S.C. S 2254(b) (1970):
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it ap-
pears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective
process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the prisoner.
The other two provisions, the Johnson Act and the Tax Injunction Act of 1937, men-
tioned at note 15 supra, divest district courts of jurisdiction if "a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the (state) courts." Id. §§ 1342(4), 1341.
2 Schwartz v. Galveston Ind. School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 1034 (S.D. Tex. 1970). See
also Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HAV.
L. REV. 1486 (1969).
[Vol. 26
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the continuing validity of this approach. The first case, Monroe v. Pape,' in-
dicated that because the federal remedies provided by the Civil Rights Act
were supplementary to any state remedy that might be available to redress
unconstitutional action under color of state law, a plaintiff need not exhaust
state judicial remedies before suing under the Act. Then in McNeese v. Board
of Education,'4 Damico v. California,' King v. Smith," and Houghton v.
Shafer"' the Supreme Court held that a civil rights plaintiff need not exhaust
his state administrative remedies.
Because the last four decisions perfunctorily cited Monroe v. Pape as
authority, and because that decision is not clear,"8 some courts" and commenta-
tors" have hesitated to pronounce the death sentence upon the exhaustion
principle in civil rights cases. This skepticism has been encouraged by a refer-
ence in Monroe to the inadequacy or unavailability of a state remedy under
- 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (plaintiffs alleged that police officers illegally searched their
home).
24373 U.S. 668 (1963) (plaintiffs sought to enforce their right to attend racially in-
tegrated schools).
S389 U.S. 416 (1967) (plaintiffs alleged that a California welfare statute and regula-
tion were discriminatory).
26392 U.S. 309 (1968) (the plaintiffs alleged that a state welfare regulation violated
the equal protection clause). In King the Court rather curiously stated: "Decisions of this
Court ... establish that a plaintiff in an action brought under the Civil Rights Act . ..
is not required to exhaust administrative remedies, where the constitutional question is
sufficiently substantial, as here, to require the convening of a three-judge court." Id. at 312
n.4 (emphasis added). This interesting gloss was discounted in Ricciotti v. Warwick School
Comm., 319 F. Supp. 1006, 1011 (D.R.I. 1970), in which the court said:
Thus King seemed to have narrowed the broad language of Damico. How-
ever, given a further opportunity to explain the status of the exhaustion doc-
trine in 1983 actions, in Houghton v. Shafer .... which had been heard by
a single District Judge, the Court stated in dictum [in Houghton pursuit
of the state remedy would have been futile] that, 'In any event, resort to
[state administrative] remedies is unnecessary in light of our decisions in
[McNeese and Damico].'
It is this type of Supreme Court language that prompted the Second Circuit to retain the
exhaustion requirement in certain instances. See text accompanying note 32 infra.
In any event, the expansion of abstention, see notes 60-79 infra, may put renewed em-
phasis on exhaustion of state remedies---even in civil rights actions.
27392 U.S. 639 (1968) (per curiam).
" The language of Monroe is, it must be admitted, susceptible of narrower interpreta-
tions on the exhaustion issue. For instance, it may be that exhaustion is not appropriate
only when legal rather than equitable relief is sought. See Potwora v. Dillon, 386 F.2d 74,
76 (2d Cir. 1967): "Monroe v. Pape was an action for damages and . . .must be read in
that light ...." See also Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act.
68 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1204 (1968). In Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 523 (2d
Cir. 1967), Judge Kaufman explained:
It is appropriate to note, however, that recently we had occasion to observe
that the Supreme Court did not intend Monroe and McNeese to abrogate the
historic principle that federal courts will not entertain a suit in equity when
'plain, adequate and complete' remedy may be had at law. Potwora v. Dillon
.... Of course, Monroe settled beyond cavil that exhaustion is not required
when only legal relief is sought. And, in any event, in this suit for both
legal and equitable relief it is only too clear that New York's remedies are
inadequate.
2'Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519
(2d Cir. 1967), rev'g 257 F. Supp. 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1966); Burnett v. Short, 311 F. Supp.
586 (S.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 441 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1971);
Schwartz v. Galveston Ind. School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 1034 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Holland
v. Beto, 309 F. Supp. 784 (S.D. Tex. 1970). See also Ricciotti v. Warwick School Comm.,
319 F. Supp. 1006 (D.R.I. 1970).
' See Note, supra note 28; Note, supra note 22.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the particular circumstances.31 Thus, the Second Circuit has refused to cast off
the exhaustion principle, at least with respect to administrative remedies. In
Eisen v. Eastman, after an analysis of Monroe, McNeese, Damico, Smith, and
Houghton, the court concluded in the words of Judge Friendly:
Despite the breadth of some of the language, particularly in the Damico per
curiam, we thus read these decisions as simply condemning a wooden applica-
tion of the exhaustion doctrine in cases under the Civil Rights Act. Exhaustion
of state administrative remedies is not required where the administrative
remedy is inadequate, as in McNeese, or where it is certainly or probably
futile, as in Damico, Smith and Houghton .... We shall need much clearer
directions than the Court has yet given or, we believe, will give, before we
hold that plaintiffs in such cases may turn their backs on state administrative
remedies and rush into a federal forum, whether their actions fall under the
Civil Rights Act or come under general federal question jurisdiction."
The same reasoning might suggest the survival of the related principle with
respect to state judicial remedies. However, the Fifth Circuit has held that
such exhaustion is not a prerequisite to a Civil Rights Act suit, "since the
cause of action established by that statute is fully supplementary to any remedy,
adequate or inadequate, that might exist under state law. '
As the above sampling indicates, the exhaustion principle has been dealt
some mortal blows, but the particular circumstances of a given case and a
friendly judge can breath life back into it. Even if the exhaustion principle is
discarded as a doctrine of independent force, nevertheless the existence of ade-
quate, untried state remedies may enter as a factor disguised under the rubrics
of abstention or comity."4
B. Abstention
In contrast to exhaustion of state remedies, the principle of abstention does
not arise from a jurisdictional or even "pseudo-jurisdictional"3 requirement.
Rather, abstention is a device reflecting a judicial policy of avoiding decisions
on constitutional questions unless absolutely necessary to the disposition of
the case." There are also a cluster of other supporting policies, such as the
varying degrees of state interest that emerge in various categories of cases. 7
3' "[T]he state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice." Mon-
roe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961).32421 F.2d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 1969) (emphasis added) (plaintiff, a landlord, alleged
city rent control law authorized deprivation of property without due process of law).3 Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cit. 1971), citing Moreno v. Henckel,
431 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970).
mSee Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Nelson, 327 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Ariz. 1971), and
Doe v. Randall, 314 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1970), afI'd mem. sub nom. Hodgson v. Ran-
dall, 402 U.S. 967 (1971), in which the availability of state declaratory judgment relief
weighed heavily in the balancing of federal and state interests required under the principle
of comity. But see Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam), in
which an abstention order was vacated because the lower court's only basis for abstaining
was the conviction that a state declaratory judgment remedy must be pursued prior to the
maintenance of a federal action seeking to invalidate a state statute on fourteenth amend-
ment grounds. See also Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullen, 40 U.S.L.W. 4569, 4573 (U.S.
May 30, 1972): "Similarly, the availability of declaratory relief in Michigan courts on
appellants' federal claims is wholly beside the point."35 Moreno v. Henckel, 431 F.2d 1299, 1307 (5th Cir. 1970).
31 See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).37 See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 5 52, at 196 (2d
ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT).
[Vol. 26
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The best known example of abstention occurred in Railroad Commission v.
Pullman Co.8 The Texas Railroad Commission's order requiring that all
"sleeping cars" be operated only in the continuous charge of a Pullman con-
ductor was challenged as being violative of the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution and as ultra vires under state law. Negro porters intervened,
arguing that because all Pullman conductors were white and all porters were
Negro, the order constituted segregation violative of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Because the case could possibly be resolved by an interpretation of the
state statute without reaching the constitutional issue, the Supreme Court, in
its equitable discretion, ordered the trial court to abstain from the case, but re-
tain jurisdiction pending a state court determination. 9
Although other types of abstention have been labeled," Pullman-type ab-
stention has been the one most often used by federal courts to avoid civil
rights issues. From its inception abstention has been held to be applicable
"only in narrowly limited 'special circumstances.' "' For instance, abstention
should be applied only when the issue of state law is uncertain." If a statute
will be unconstitutional regardless of how it may be construed by state courts,
abstention is improper.' Again, although it has been held that abstention may
be invoked in civil rights cases," certain types of civil rights actions may have
a preferred claim to a federal forum.
When a state statute is challenged as being facially unconstitutional, sev-
eral guidelines have emerged for determining the propriety of abstention.
When the state statute could be narrowly construed so as to avoid all constitu-
tional issues, and state courts have not yet authoritatively construed the statute,
abstention is generally proper." Affirmative answers to the following questions
generally lead to abstention in any particular context: (1) Is the state law
uncertain? (2) If it is uncertain, is narrowing construction of the state statute
likely and available in the state courts?
In several cases the Supreme Court has indicated that when a state statute
is attacked on its face on first amendment grounds, abstention is not proper.'
But a closer look at these cases shows that the Court was merely applying in a
first amendment context the principle of Harman v. Forssenius. The Fors-
senius principle is that abstention is improper when the state statute would be
18312 U.S. 496 (1941).
" The problems faced by plaintiffs in avoiding res judicata principles, while at the
same time preserving constitutional points for appeal, are discussed in England v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). There is also the possibility that
a state will refuse to take jurisdiction so long as the federal court retains jurisdiction. United
Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965).
40See generally WRIGHT § 52; H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 872-73.
'Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967), quoting Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S.
472, 492 (1949).
'Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullen, 40 U.S.L.W. 4569 (U.S. May 30, 1972); Harman
v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965).
4 Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965).
"Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
"Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970) (per curiam); Reetz v. Bozanich,
397 U.S. 82 (1970); see notes 66-68 infra, and accompanying text.
4 0 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965);
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
47380 U.S. 528 (1965).
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unconstitutional regardless of the construction a state court might give it."
Thus, refusal to abstain is justified, in the language of Dombrowski v. Pfister,
when "a statute regulating speech is properly attacked on its face, and where,
as here, the conduct charged in the indictments is not within the reach of an
acceptable limiting construction readily to be anticipated as the result of a
single criminal prosecution and is not the sort of 'hardcore' conduct that would
obviously be prohibited under any construction.""' Therefore, in first amend-
ment cases, not only must the state law be uncertain and subject to a narrow-
ing construction, but that remedy must be readily available in a single crimi-
nal prosecution.
A distinction is drawn between challenges for overbreadth and those for
vagueness. The above-quoted language from Dombrowski indicates that ab-
stention is not proper when a state statute is legitimately challenged as being
overbroad in the sense that the statute clearly criminalizes protected speech or
activity." However, when the substance of the claim is that the statute is merely
vague in the sense that the scope of the statute is ambiguous,'1 abstention may
be proper if: (1) a limiting construction is "readily to be anticipated as the
result of a single criminal prosecution"; and (2) the plaintiff's conduct is
"hardcore."" The reasoning is essentially that although every vague statute is
also overbroad in that it potentially reaches protected speech or activity, never-
theless a vague statute could at least possibly receive a limiting construction
in a single criminal prosecution." When the statute, on the other hand, is
overbroad--i.e., clearly reaching protected speech or activity-such a limiting
construction is impossible.'
It, therefore, would seem to be inaccurate to say that abstention has been
eliminated from first amendment cases, for although its role is severely limited,
in certain vagueness cases it may operate to remit a plaintiff to state court for
a determination of the intended or permitted scope of the challenged statute."
4'See WRIGHT 5 52, at 207.
49380 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1965) (emphasis added).
"See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Maraist, supra note 7, at
559-60. See generally Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109
U. PA. L. REV. 66 (1960).
"See, e.g., Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963); Maraist, supra note 7, at 559.
51380 U.S. at 491-92. See also Rollins v. Shannon, 292 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mo. 1968),
vacated and remanded, 401 U.S. 988 (1971).
"In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969), the Supreme
Court commented upon the state court's "remarkable job of plastic surgery upon the face
of the ordinance." See Hunter v. Allen, 422 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Embry v. Allen, 401 U.S. 989 (1971) (if the statute is merely
vague, "federal judicial review must be secured through other channels"); Carmichael v.
Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985, 996 (N.D. Ga. 1967) (injunctive relief is proper only when the
statute is overbroad).
"See WRIGHT 207-08. Abstention is also improper if the statute is being enforced
in bad faith or for harassment purposes--i.e., "for the purpose of discouraging protected
activities." Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490 (1965).
"The Fifth Circuit has apparently refused to recognize any distinction between vague-
ness and overbreadth cases, lumping them both under the latter label. This seems to be
based upon a skepticism that any vague statute could ever be acceptably construed in one
single state proceeding as to all persons potentially affected. However, one can also detect
an overriding desire by the court to assure a federal forum in all freedom of speech cases:
Abstention . . . might be quite appropriate in the normal case to assure
that the challenged state statute will actually be interpreted to reach the
activities of the persons attacking its validity. But in an overbreadth case,
where particular applications of a statute are not determinative and where
[Vol. 26
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Recent Supreme Court decisions outside the first amendment area demon-
strate a renewed emphasis upon the use of Pullman-type abstention. The
Pullman rationale, the avoidance of constitutional questions, is still recited.
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the present Court is now bootlegging into the
concept of abstention the objective of stemming the tide of three-judge court
convenings and direct appeals, and is requiring, in practical effect, the ex-
haustion of state judicial remedies. These recent abstention cases will be view-
ed first against the cases from the 1960's.
Although the Court had previously held that abstention may be proper in
civil rights cases,' some of the reasoning and language in Monroe v. Pape
and McNeese v. Board of Education hinted that the Court might be coming
to the view that abstention was improper. Thus, Monroe asserted that the Civil
Rights Act remedy was supplementary to the state remedy, and that it was
irrelevant that the state action complained of was violative of the state con-
stitution and laws. 7 These assertions seemed to allow little room for deference
to the state courts. And in McNeese it was thought that the Court was expressly
creating a civil rights exception 5" to the abstention doctrine when it said: "We
would defeat [the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 19831 if we held that assertion of
a federal claim in a federal court must await an attempt to vindicate the same
claim in a state court.""
However, in 1971 the Court in Askew v. Hargrave" refused to give such
a broad effect to the two previous decisions. The plaintiffs in Askew chal-
lenged the Florida public education financing system, arguing that the system
effected an invidious discrimination against poor school districts in violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. After the suit was
filed, other plaintiffs brought a state court action challenging the financing
system on state constitutional grounds. The three-judge federal court, however,
refused to abstain, relying upon Monroe and McNeese for the proposition that
"[tihe fact that a state remedy is available is not a valid basis for federal court
abstention."" The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, saying:
The reliance upon Monroe v. Pape and McNeese was misplaced. Monroe v.
Pape is not in point, for there 'the state remedy, though adequate in theory,
was not available in practice.' . . . McNeese held that 'assertion of a federal
conceptions of standing and ripeness are modified, such assurances are largely
irrelevant .... Moreover, even if it be assumed that a state court could resolve
the overbreadth problems, either by means of 'an acceptable limiting construc-
tion readily to be anticipated' or by avoiding the statute on its face, abstention
is nevertheless inappropriate. In such a situation the state courts would simply
be deciding a federal constitutional issue within the framework of construing
state law. A primary motive for abstaining-avoidance of constitutional is-
sues-is not served. The issue is simply referred to another forum. The state
courts, however, possess no special institutional competence to decide such
issues. Since the federal courts are at least as adequate a forum, no real pur-
pose would be served by denying a litigant his choice of a federal forum.
Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 463 (5th Cir. 1971).
5"See text at note 44 supra. See also Koehler v. Ogilvie, 53 F.R.D. 98, 103 (N.D. Ill.
1971).
1 365 U.S. at 183.
" See Maraist, supra note 7, at 540.
1 373 U.S. at 672.
60401 U.S. 476 (1971) (per curiam).
01 Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944, 947 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
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claim in a federal court [need not] await an attempt to vindicate the same
claim in a state court.' ... Our understanding from the colloquy on oral argu-
ment with counsel for the parties is that the [pending state] case asserts, not
the 'same claim,' that is, the federal claim of alleged denial of the federal right
of equal protection, but primarily state law claims under the Florida Constitu-
tion, which claims, if sustained, will obviate the necessity of determining the
Fourteenth Amendment question."
It is difficult to predict the effect Askew will have upon civil rights absten-
tion. The opinion is ambiguous in many respects. First, what is the importance
of the fact that the state court action, though filed after the federal suit, was
nevertheless pending during the federal proceedings?"' Second, if Askew is
not limited to cases actually pending in state courts, does it require abstention
when a potential challenge could be made on state constitutional grounds?
It should be noted here that the court distinguishes McNeese, in which a state
action was pending, as a case involving the same [federal] claims in both state
and federal court. By implication, whenever a state constitution has a due
process or equal protection clause, and a state action can be brought, or is
pending, challenging a state law on such grounds, federal abstention may be
proper. Although the intent of Monroe and McNeese was to disapprove ab-
stention in such a situation,"' it is now apparent that in particular instances
the federal court must undertake the difficult chore of determining the worth
of a potential state constitutional law claim." Third, how much discretion has
the Supreme Court left the trial judge to abstain or not to abstain? In remand-
ing Askew the Court referred the district court to Reetz v. Bozanich" as a
recent case stating the abstention principles "that should inform the exercise
of the district Court's discretion as to whether to abstain,""7 but did not order
abstention. Thus, the Court in Askew did not hold that abstention was called
for, but merely that Monroe and McNeese did not preclude abstention. How-
"'401 U.S. at 478.
13 In this connection Askew raises another important question: Was the single fact that
a state proceeding was pending in Askew sufficient in itself to justify abstention, not be-
cause the state law was uncertain and a narrowing construction was possible, but solely be-
cause a decision holding the statute unconstitutional on state law grounds would have
avoided the federal constitutional questions? In Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235, 1238
(D.N.J. 1971), the court, in dictum, answered this question affirmatively, saying essentially
that the uncertainty requirement drops out "when the identical issue is pending in the state
court." However, the Spencer court found Askew inapplicable because the Spencer plaintiffs
in the federal case were challenging the racial balance in the schools; whereas, the state
plaintiffs alleged a violation of equal protection resulting from the taxing measures used
to finance the educational system.
"A district court has so read Askew, Monroe, and McNeese. Osmond v. Spence, 327
F. Supp. 1349, 1351 n.4 (D. Del. 1971) : "We think Reetz v. Bozanich [the case cited in
Askew as providing correct abstention guidelines] . .. is distinguishable because the case
before us involves substantially the same claim under the Delaware State Constitution."
"In Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970) (per curiam), the Court by
way of a footnote pointed out that the Puerto Rico Constitution had a due process pro-
vision. Id. at 44 n.3. Thus, the Court implied that at least one consideration behind the
order to abstain was the possibility that the state rather than the federal constitutional pro-
vision would be used to invalidate the statute, if invalidation was called for. See also Wis-
consin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439-43 (1971) (dissenting opinion), in which
Chief Justice Burger noted that although the Wisconsin Constitution had no due process
or equal protection clause as such, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had interpreted one pro-
vision as having substantially the same effect.
"397 U.S. 82 (1970).7 401 U.S. at 478.
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ever, in Reetz the Supreme Court ordered abstention. There the plaintiff chal-
lenged an Alaska statute governing salmon net gear licensing for commercial
fishing. The application of several Alaska constitutional and statutory provi-
sions relating specifically to the use of fish resources could have obviated the
necessity of reaching federal constitutional issues. Emphasizing that the regula-
tion of the use of fishing resources is particularly a matter of state concern,
the Court ordered the district court to abstain." It is, therefore, unclear whether
in Askew the Supreme Court might allow the trial judge not to abstain if he
were not to find present the Reetz elements, such as unresolved questions of
state law, novel and difficult problems of construction for the federal court,
and a regulatory scheme in which the state has a strong interest.
There is another odd point about the Askew decision. The Court did not
discuss why the Florida law was "uncertain." Perhaps uncertainty was pre-
sumed because the statute was relatively new. On the other hand, a finding of
uncertainty has always been an important threshold prerequisite to Pullman-
type abstention.6' Indeed, the mere fact that the state law question may be dis-
positive of the case is not enough; a prior condition is that the state law must
also be unclear."0
The reality is that the uncertainty requirement of abstention is a judicial
chameleon. "State law" is always uncertain to the extent it cannot be deter-
mined from reading statute books or legal digests but depends upon a predic-
tion of what the state courts in fact will do with the controversy.7' And unless
full state and federal constitutional challenges have recently been made by
some other parties in state court," then to an abstentionist, any question-
whether it involves a new statute fresh out of the legislature," or a procedure
from antiquity" 4-will raise "uncertainty" under state law, and the federal court
should abstain. On the other hand, "certainty" can also be judicially imposed
upon the state law, by assuming away the ambiguities, and thus refusing the
abstention. In Wisconsin v. Constantineau,T2 decided in January 1971, the
Supreme Court thus affirmed a three-judge court decision invalidating the old
69In a more recent decision, Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970) (per
curiam), the Supreme Court also ordered abstention in a case challenging the Puerto Rico
Dealer's Contract Law. That law imposed liability on manufacturers for unilaterally termi-
nating contracts with local dealers, regardless of the terms of the contracts, for other than
"just cause." The First Circuit held that the statute was violative of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, primarily on the strength of its own interpretation that the
statute was to have retroactive effect. 423 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court
ordered abstention because Puerto Rico courts had not authoritatively construed the statute,
and the statute could conceivably be construed to avoid the fourteenth amendment issue.
However, as in Reetz, the Court emphasized that the peculiarly local nature of the subject
matter (here the Spanish tradition of Puerto Rico's laws) should cause a federal court to
give deference to state, or as in this case, territorial courts.
"°Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 438 (1971); Harman v. Forssenius, 380
U.S. 528, 534 (1965).70 Id.
" By analogy consider the jurisprudential debate over how to "guess" state law under
the Erie doctrine. See generally WRIGHT § 58.
7" If the same parties begin in state court, they may be precluded by res judicata from
returning to federal court, unless they can understand the difficult decision in England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).73 See, e.g., Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971) (per curiam); Fornaris v. Ridge
Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970) (per curiam); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
74 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 439 (1971).
15400 U.S. 439 (1971).
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Wisconsin drunk-posting statute over objections that the state courts should
be given the first chance at it.
In his dissent Chief Justice Burger revealed rather forcefully his views on
quibbling over uncertainty and set out the dominant values that make it easy
for him to decide abstention cases:
It is no answer to contend that there is no ambiguity in the Wisconsin
statute and hence no need to abstain; in Reetz the Alaska statute could not
have been more plain, or less susceptible of a limiting construction. Yet, in
furtherance of this Court's firm policy to steer around head-on collisions with
the States by avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions, we reversed the
District Court and remanded with instructions to stay its hand while the liti-
gants exhausted state court remedies for resolution of their challenge to the
statute.6
The Chief Justice continued, explaining his reasons for advocating a rule re-
quiring a litigant to exhaust state judicial remedies before resort to federal
court:
I quite agree that there is no absolute duty to abstain-to stay our hand-
until the state courts have at least been asked to construe their own statute, but
for me, it is the negation of sound judicial administration-and an unwar-
ranted use of a limited judicial resource-to impose this kind of case on a
three-judge federal district court, and then, by direct appeal, on this Court.
Indeed, in my view, a three-judge district court would be well advised in
cases such as this, involving no urgency or question of large import, to decline
to act.
This Court has an abundance of important work to do, which, if it is to be
done well, should not be subject to the added pressures of non-urgent state
cases which the state courts have never been called on to resolve. Neither the
historic role of this Court nor any reasonable duty placed on us, calls for our
direct intervention when no reason for expedited review is shown. Here we
have an example of an unwise statute making direct review prima facie avail-
able, and an unwillingness by the Court to follow its own precedents by declin-
ing to pass on the Wisconsin statute before Wisconsin does so. We should
remand this case with directions to the three-judge court to refrain from acting
until the Wisconsin courts have acted."
Thus, if the Chief Justice's approach is found persuasive by other members
of the Court,8 it could be that the Court will do away with the uncertainty
requirement altogether and simply apply his "non-urgent state cases" test."
In any event, abstention principles will represent a formidable obstacle to
the federal courthouse door in the 1970's."°
781 Id. at 442 (dissenting opinion).
77 Id. at 443.
78 In Constantineau Justice Blackmun concurred in Justice Black's dissent, which, like
Chief Justice Burger's dissent, disagreed with the majority on the uncertainty of the Wis-
consin statute. Id. at 443-45.
7 Interestingly, in Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullen, 40 U.S.L.W. 4569 (U.S. May 30,
1972), a majority of the Court affirmed abstention in a case challenging the Michigan
Watercraft Pollution Control Act of 1970, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 323.331 (Supp. 1972).
The Chief Justice and Justice Powell dissented, being of the opinion that the case was suffi-
ciently "urgent" to justify federal intervention. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4574-75.
" At least one court has perceived the beginning of a new trend:
There are a number of federal court opinions, many recently from the
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, that in my judgment indicate a growing
resistance, and even resentment, to the institution of these actions [three-
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C. Comity
Before there was a United States, equity courts were busy weaving a body
of principles restraining the use of injunctive relief unless there was inade-
quate remedy at law and irreparable injury.8 ' There were many variations of
this major theme, such as equity only acts to protect property rights," equity
will not enjoin parties from proceeding in other courts," or equity will not
enjoin a criminal prosecution. 4 These maxims developed from a keen judicial
sense of restraint based upon pragmatic political considerations. Much of this
equity jurisprudence, insofar as it rested upon respect for the functioning of
other courts, has been called "comity."
In Hilton v. Guyot Justice Gray characterized comity in the legal sense as
neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy
and good will, upon the other. " " In the United States one peculiarly American
variety of comity has evolved within the concept of "federalism." In essence
the principle requires of the federal government nothing more or less than a
"decent respect for the states."
As if this delicate balance of federalism would not have been difficult
enough for the federal courts to maintain by their own lights, Congress has
at times been inconsistent in granting with one hand, and taking away with
the other, powers that regulate federal judicial intrusion into state processes.
The general grant of federal question jurisdiction" and, more significantly, the
jurisdiction granted in the Civil Rights Act of 1871" have over the years put
great pressure on the federal courts to intervene in state executive, legislative,
and judicial functions to protect federal constitutional rights. On the other
hand, since 1793 some form of federal statute has been on the books expressly
prohibiting federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings." The present
judge court cases] with their accompanying burdens almost exclusively in the
federal courts. This deliberate by-pass of state courts and administrative tri-
bunals or agencies is unexplainable to many responsible lawyers as well as
the citizenry inasmuch as the issues arise basically from the wording and
purposes of State laws. Courts in difficulty will stretch to divert or abstain
when valid and new distinctions can be found to limit the open door policy
of unrestricted entry if the choice be made continuously to file in the federal
court system when competent and clearly available judicial remedy is present
unquestionably in the state court system.
Bond v. Dentzer, 325 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (N.D.N.Y. 1971).
" Z. CHAFEE & E. RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITY 795-817 (5th ed. 1967);
J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 132 (S. Symons ed. 1941).
"Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818); see Webber v. Gray, 228 Ark. 289,
307 S.W.2d 80 (1967); Ex parte Warfield, 40 Tex. Crim. 413, 50 S.W. 933 (1899).
'Z. CHAFEE & E. RE, supra note 81, at 99-138; J. POMEROY, supra note 81, § 1361b.
'
4 Z. CHAFEE & E. RE, supra note 81, at 935-79; J. POMEROY, supra note 81, § 1361b.
85 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (here, comity between nations).
"fEx parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 176 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"Judge Wisdom noted that the coexistence in the United States of both centripetal
and centrifugal forces under the banner of federalism "is something like Alexander Ham-
ilton and Thomas Jefferson sharing an apartment happily together." Wisdom, supra note
4, at 413.
"Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (now 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970)).
"Principally, the cause of action granted and the jurisdiction conferred in 42 U.S.C.
5 1983 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970), respectively.
"See Reaves & Golden, The Federal Anti-Injunction Statute in the Aftermath of At-
lantic Coast Line Railroad, 5 GA. L. REv. 294 (1971); Comment, How a Federal Court
May Enjoin State Infringement Upon Civil Liberties Within the Confines of the Atlantic
Coast Line Decision, 5 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 291, 293 (1971).
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statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283,1 has figured prominently as evidence of a counter-
vailing national policy in favor of allowing state courts to carry on their busi-
ness free of interference by federal courts.92
Appropriately, the blunt prohibitions of the anti-injunction statute have
often been found inapplicable. To create more finely honed instruments of
flexibility, the federal judiciary has instead used principles of equity and comity
to shape its own guidelines on a case-by-case basis. These guidelines, then,
result from attempts in each case to balance the importance of the claims to
federal court protection of constitutional rights against the interest of the
states in being the deciders in the first instance. A closer look at these comity-
inspired limits upon the equitable powers of federal courts reveals a great deal
of kinship with abstention.
Judicially Created Limits on Equitable Discretion, In anticipation of the criti-
cism that the result in Ex parte Young would inaugurate a "great flood of
litigation" of the same kind, the Court in Young responded: "[I3n the first
place, ... no injunction ought to be granted unless in a case reasonably free
from doubt. We think such rule is, and will be, followed by all the judges
of the Federal courts.""° Beginning with this vague assurance, the Court has
seen fit to restrict the exercise of federal equitable jurisdiction. First, this was
accomplished solely by the general principles of equity, and later by additional
qualifiers and caveats such that it can safely be said that federal courts may
enjoin pending or threatened state proceedings only in special, limited cir-
cumstances.
In 1923 in Terrace v. Thompson!' the Court upheld an injunction against
the enforcement of an alien land law. The traditional prerequisites to equitable
relief were relied upon:
The unconstitutionality of a state law is not itself ground for equitable
relief in the courts of the United States. That a suit in equity does not lie
where there is a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law is so well under-
stood as not to require the citation of authorities. But the legal remedy must
be as complete, practical and efficient as that which equity could afford....
Equity jurisdiction will be exercised to enjoin the threatened enforcement of a
state law which contravenes the Federal Constitution wherever it is essential
in order effectually to protect property rights and the rights of persons against
injuries otherwise irremediable ...."'
However, only three years later in Fenner v. Boykin the Court further re-
stricted the equitable discretion of federal courts:
Ex parte Young... and following cases have established the doctrine that
when absolutely necessary for protection of constitutional rights courts of the
United States have power to enjoin state officers from instituting criminal
actions. But this may not be done except under extraordinary circumstances
where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate."
9128 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
92See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 129 (1941).
9209 U.S. 123, 166-67 (1908).
9263 U.S. 197 (1923).
"Id. at 214.
96271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926) (emphasis added).
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It thus became the rule that injunctions against threatened state prosecu-
tions were rarely issued." Many cases were reversed on the basis that the
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of "both great and immediate"
irreparable injury." But in these cases and the few in which injunctive relief
was upheld the Court began to outline in greater detail just what kinds of
injuries would justify equitable intervention. Focusing on the circumstances
attending a state criminal prosecution under an allegedly unconstitutional
statute, the Court had said in Fenner:
Ordinarily, there should be no interference with [state] officers; primarily,
they are charged with the duty of prosecuting offenders against the laws of the
State and must decide when and how this is to be done. The accused should
first set up and rely upon his defense in the state courts, even though this in-
volves a challenge of the validity of some statute, unless it plainly appears that
this course would not afford adequate protection." '
Thus, the ordinary trials and tribulations of a state criminal prosecution with-
out more were insufficient to authorize an injunction. But the italicized phrase
above from Fenner indicated that in extraordinary circumstances, when the
single state prosecution for some reason did not afford the defendant adequate
protection, injunctive relief would be proper.
In Hague v. CIO ' the 1939 Court was faced with a case which clearly fore-
shadowed the many 1960 cases which would charge bad faith and harass-
ment by city officials. The plaintiff labor organizers alleged an intentional
plan of harassment by city officials for the purpose of denying the plaintiffs
first amendment rights. The harassment consisted of arrests, threats of con-
tinuing arrests, unlawful searches and seizures, and, in addition, banishment
of the plaintiffs from the city. In these extraordinary circumstances the Court
upheld an injunction against the city officials and declared an ordinance, which
arbitrarily denied freedom of assembly, unconstitutional.
In Beal v. Missouri Pacific Railroad10 ' the Court stated that a multiplicity
of prosecutions brought in bad faith under an unconstitutional statute would
satisfy the standard of equitable discretion set out in Fenner."' The threat of
multiple prosecutions was, in Watson v. Buck, distinguished from the situation
in which the state officers merely stand ready to perform their duty under a
statute: "[S]uch a general statement is not the equivalent of a threat that
prosecutions are to be begun so immediately, in such numbers, and in such
manner as to indicate the virtual certainty of that extraordinary injury which
alone justifies equitable suspension of proceedings in criminal courts."'" In
1943 the Fenner rule of nonintervention except in extraordinary circumstances,
as described in Hague, Beal, and Watson, was reaffirmed in Douglas v. City of
Jeannette.'
9 Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943).
9"Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S.
157 (1943); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312
U.S. 45 (1941); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935).
g 271 U.S. at 244 (emphasis added).
100307 U.S. 496 (1939).
101312 U.S. 45 (1941).
"I/d. at 50.
103313 U.S. 387, 400 (1941).
104319 U.S. 157 (1943).
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In 1964 in Baggett v. Bullitt"° the Court seemed to create a first amend-
ment exception to the rule of Fenner. The statute in Baggett required state
teachers to take an oath that they would "by precept and example promote
respect for the flag and the institutions of the United States of America and
the State of Washington .... ."" The Court stated: "The State may not re-
quire one to choose between subscribing to an unduly vague and broad oath,
thereby incurring the likelihood of prosecution, and conscientiously refusing
to take the oath with the consequent loss of employment, and perhaps pro-
fession, particularly where 'the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser.'""
There were also a few lower-court applications of the Fenner rule that ap-
peared to permit courts to consider the importance of the right sought to be
protected as part of a totality of circumstances indicating great and immediate
irreparable injury,"' This was the state of the law prior to the Court's decision
in Dombrowski v. Pfister
In Dombrowski the plaintiffs, the Southern Conference Educational Fund,
Inc. (SCEF), a southern Negro civil rights organization, and its executive
director, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials to pro-
hibit them from prosecuting or threatening to prosecute the plaintiffs under
the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law' " and the
Communist Propaganda Control Law."' The laws were alleged to be over-
broad, but in addition, the plaintiffs alleged that Louisiana officials had con-
ducted raids on SCEF's headquarters and the homes of its officers, unlawfully
searching and seizing organization records and membership lists. Other alle-
gations were made to the effect that the plaintiffs were arrested and indicted
under the two above laws and that the official harassment had frightened off
potential members and contributors. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs
relief, and in so doing held that: (1) the anti-injunction statute was not
applicable; (2) abstention was not proper; and (3) comity did not preclude
injunctive relief.
Although the words of section 2283 do not speak to the question, the Court,
Justice Brennan writing for the majority, held that its prohibition did not apply
to state court proceedings not commenced before the filing of the complaint
in federal court. Thus, despite the fact that indictments.' had been returned
against the plaintiffs during the pendency of the federal suit, no proceedings
"'377 U.S. 360 (1964).
"' id. at 362. But see note 247 infra.
"
7 Id. at 374.
"'Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
939 (1965) (first amendment deprivation); Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir.
1963) (first amendment deprivation and racial segregation); Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d
102 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958) (racial segregation); Bush v. Orleans
Parish School Bd., 194 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. La.), afl'd sub nom. Gremillion v. United
States, 368 U.S. 11 (1961) (racial segregation); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707
(M.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (racial segregation).
"'1LA. REV. STAT. § 14:358-:374 (Cum. Supp. 1969).
"'Id. §§ 14:390-:390.8.
.. Under the broad construction of the term "proceedings" in Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S.
393, 403 (1935), the return of an indictment is generally deemed part of a state criminal
proceeding. See McSurely v. Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Ky. 1967), appeal dismissed,
390 U.S. 412 (1968). But see Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1969);
Turner v. LaBelle, 251 F. Supp. 443 (D. Conn. 1966).
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were in being at the critical point in time."' "To hold otherwise would mean
that any threat of prosecution sufficient to justify equitable intervention would
also be a 'proceeding' for § 2283.""' Therefore, the actual holding in Dom-
browski did not speak to the propriety of equitable intervention in pending
state criminal prosecutions.
Abstention was deemed improper in cases in which "statutes are justifiably
attacked on their face as abridging free expression, or as applied for the pur-
pose of discouraging protected activities.""' 4 Justice Brennan did not at this
point in the quoted language distinguish between overbroad statutes and
merely vague statutes.115 However, he later qualified the prohibition on ab-
stention and allowed that abstention could be proper when a merely vague
statute regulating expression is challenged by one whose conduct could be
validly punishable under a narrowed construction of the statute, and when such
a narrowing construction is readily obtainable from a single criminal prosecu-
tion." In any event, Justice Brennan's first use of the disjunctive clearly meant
that either facial overbreadth or bad faith enforcement or harassment would
make abstention improper."' But abstention is one thing and comity is another.
Since abstention and comity are distinct but related concepts, the use of the
disjunctive in the abstention discussion of Dombrowski might have been re-
sponsible in part for many lower courts applying the same disjunctive to the
issue of comity. Although the Dombrowski Court often repeated the words
"in this case" and "here" when reaching its conclusions on the propriety of
injunctive relief, the opinion, when taken with the abstention discussions, is
subject to a fair interpretation that proof of bad faith or harassment is not
required to impart "chilling" properties to an overbroad statute' 1 -and that
either the mere presence of an overbroad statute or bad faith enforcement of
or harassment under a statute regulating expression will justify injunctive re-
lief. However, that is not what Dombrowski held. Justice Brennan's opinion
relied heavily upon the presence of evidence of bad faith enforcement and
harassment-and made it clear that mere facial unconstitutionality of a statute
regulating free expression,"' absent bad faith or harassment, will not justify
11 "The indictments were obtained only because the District Court erroneously dis-
missed the complaint and dissolved the temporary restraining order issued by Judge Wis-
dom in aid of the jurisdiction of the District Court properly invoked by the complaint."
380 U.S. at 484 n.2.113 Id.
1
4 Id. at 489-90 (emphasis added).
... See notes 50-53 supra, and accompanying text.
116 380 U.S. at 489-90.
"'See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241
(1967); Maraist, supra note 7, at 569.
118 E.g.: "Because of the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression, we
have not required that all of those subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test
their rights." 380 U.S. at 486.
"" It is clear that just any statute will not do. See Porter v. Kimzey, 309 F. Supp. 993,
995 (N.D. Ga. 1970), af'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971):
There must be a 'nexus' between the right sought to be protected and the
right ostensibly restricted by the statute . . . . To cite an extreme example,
Dombrowski could not be used to enjoin a state prosecution for the offense
of rape, murder, or the like, the ingredients of which are unconnected with
First Amendment rights, on the grounds that the statute was vague on pro-
cedural matters or that it is being used to chill First Amendment rights.
See also Bukolich v. Jury Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 97 (1969); Dameron v. Horson, 364 F.2d
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injunctive relief.12 But in such cases relief was not necessarily to be denied
altogether, and in Zwickler v. Koota"' the Court held that in such a situation
declaratory relief was proper-that, indeed, federal courts had a duty to consider
prayers for declaratory and injunctive relief separately. 2
The Anti-Injunction Statute. Despite an unpropitious beginning as an obscure
and ambiguous provision in the Judiciary Act of 1793, section 2283,"' the
anti-injunction statute, came first to be considered a codification of the prin-
ciple of comity among the federal and state courts. After the Supreme Court's
decision in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engi-
neers,1 4 the statute, when applicable, is a binding jurisdictional prohibition
upon the exercise of federal injunctive power." The statute provides: "A
court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in
a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.""1
Because Atlantic Coast Line put to rest arguments that the statute is merely a
codification of principles of comity to be disregarded in certain circumstances, 7
if a federal court, after an application of the rules of restraint of equity and
comity, still is convinced that an injunction against a state proceeding should
issue, it must come to grips with section 2283. As with any general prohibition
the applicability of the statute in particular situations is not always certain.
The statute is drafted so that its prohibition may be avoided in either of two
991 (5th Cir. 1966); Ascheim v. Quinlan, 324 F. Supp. 789, 795-96 (W.D. Pa. 1971);
Cato v. Georgia, 302 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. Ga. 1969), afl'd, 401 U.S. 984 (1971); Shaw
v. Garrison, 293 F. Supp. 937, 950 (E.D. La.), afl'd mem., 393 U.S. 220 (1968).
'
20 See Brooks v. Briley, 274 F. Supp. 538, 550 (M.D. Tenn. 1967), aff'd, 391 U.S.
361 (1968). The hindsight maxim may apply here, since many lower courts prior to the
clarification in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), did not so read Dombrowski. See,
e.g., Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 200 (1971);
Wheeler v. Goodman, 298 F. Supp. 935 (W.D.N.C. 1969); Cambist Films, Inc. v. Illinois,
292 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Il. 1968),
rev'd sub nom. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Devine v. Wood, 286 F. Supp. 102
(M.D. Ala. 1968); Heard v. Rizzo, 281 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Harris v. Younger,
281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Barber v. Kinsella, 277
F. Supp. 72 (D. Conn. 1967); Baker v. Bindner, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967);
Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1967); Midwest Video Corp. v. Camp-
bell, 250 F. Supp. 158 (D.N.M. 1965); Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995
(N.D. Cal. 1965).
111389 U.S. 241 (1967).
"
2 ld. at 254.
12"Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334-35; see Reaves & Golden, supra note
90, at 295-97; Comment, supra note 90, at 293-94.
12398 U.S. 281 (1970).
'2 "[It is] intimated that the Act only establishes a 'principle of comity,' not a binding
rule on the power of the federal court. The argument implies that in certain circumstances
a federal court may enjoin state court proceedings even if that action cannot be justified
by any of the three exceptions. We cannot accept any such contention." Id. at 286-87. In
Atlantic Coast Line the Court held that a state court injunction that prohibited picketing
could not be enjoined by a federal district court on the basis that such federal action
was "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." The
Court reached this conclusion after determining that there was no existing federal courtjudgment to protect and that the state court had concurrent jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Id. at 290, 295.
'2628 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
2 See Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699, 704 (5th Cir. 1969); Machesky v. Bizzell,
414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 593-94 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 939 (1964); Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 929, 936 (N.D.
Ill. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
[Vol. 26
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
ways: (1) by not coming within the terms of its main prohibitory clausell 'R-
e.g., when the state proceeding is not in a "state court"; or (2) by coming with-
in one of the three stated exceptions--i.e., when an injunction is expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, necessary in aid of the federal court's juris-
diction, or necessary to protect or effectuate its judgments.
(1) "Injunction To Stay Proceedings." It is well settled that the prohibition
of section 2283 is not avoided by directing an injunction to the parties to a
lawsuit rather than to the state court itself."9 Further, because the intrusion
accomplished by a declaratory judgment is supposed to be as severe as that
of an injunction,"' the rule has been emerging that the statute proscribes
declaratory relief when an injunction would also be prohibited. " Some courts
have hinted in dictum that this is not true, if under the circumstances of the
particular case declaratory relief is a sufficiently milder interference with the
state court proceeding.' However, on this issue these courts perhaps were
under the impression that they were restrained only by considerations of comity
and equity, since they are pre-Atlantic Coast Line decisions."
The question of whether a specific, partial injunction constitutes a "stay"
of the state proceedings, like the declaratory judgment question, also presents
an opportunity for technical construction of the statute. In Stefanelli v.. Min-
ard" the Supreme Court disallowed a lower-court injunction that prohibited
the use of illegally seized evidence in a state criminal proceeding." The Court
relied on the restraints of equity, comity, the anti-injunction statute, and the
policy against the "piecemeal" determination of issues." Thus, there, as in
other cases, the independent force of section 2283 is difficult to ascertain.
However, the fact that the Court made no finding that the federal injunction
would have actually halted the state prosecution in Stefanelli indicates that
section 2283 may prohibit interferences with state proceedings that fall short
of a full-fledged stay order.
(2) "In a State Court." The key words here are "in" and "state court." The
i"' The statute has been held inapplicable when the injunction is sought by the United
States. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957). See also Reaves &
Golden, supra note 90, at 300.
129Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4 (1940); Jos. L.
Muscarelle, Inc. v. Central Iron Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 791 (3d Cir. 1964); H.J. Heinz Co.
v. Owens, 189 F.2d 505 (9th Cit. 1951).
"'See notes 201-05, 228-30 infra, and accompanying text.
.. H.J. Heinz Co. v. Owens, 189 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1951); Ballard v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 109 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1940); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Consumers Fin. Serv., 101
F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1938); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Yeatts, 99 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1938).
'See Nongard v. Burlington County Bridge Comm'n, 229 F.2d 622, 625 (3d Cir.
1956); Cunningham v. A.J. Aberman, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 602, 605 (W.D. Pa. 1965), afl'd,
358 F.2d 747 (3d Cit. 1966).
'
9 9 See Golden Dawn Shops, Inc. v. Department of Housing & Urban Dev., 333 F.
Supp. 874 (E.D. Pa. 1971); infra note 390.
'1-342 U.S. 117 (1951).
19See also Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963). The situation in Stefanelli and
Cleary, in which state officers are attempting to introduce or testify with respect to illegally
obtained evidence, must be distinguished from the situation in which federal officers are
attempting to testify in a state trial and federal relief is sought to suppress that testimony
on constitutional grounds. In the latter instance federal injunctive relief is proper. Rea v.
United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956). Recently, in United States v. Navarro, 441 F.2d 409
(5th Cit. 1971), the Fifth Circuit refused to consider the possible effect of the Younger
sextet on Rea.1"6342 U.S. at 122-23.
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rule is that "court" refers to a body that performs judicial functions and not
administrative or legislative functions.' 7 Justice Holmes attempted to define
the legislative and judicial functions in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.:
"A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand
on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its
purpose and its end. Legislation, on the other hand, looks to the future and
changes existing conditions by making a new rule, to be applied thereafter to
all or some part of those subject to its power."'3 8 With this as a standard, federal
courts must look to state law to determine the character of the particular
proceeding.3 ' Even though an administrative agency must go to a state court
to enforce its rulings, until such enforcement is actually sought there is no pro-
ceeding in a state court. 4 ' If the agency may impose the sanctions of a state
penal statute, its proceedings in such matters may be deemed quasi-criminal
proceedings subject to section 2283.'
Whether there is an action pending, or "in," a state court may also be a
difficult issue in particular cases. If a part of a state court proceeding is actually
begun prior to the filing of the federal action, clearly a state court proceeding
is pending. In Dombrowski v. Pfister the Court emphasized that the critical
point in time is the moment at which federal jurisdiction attaches." Thus,
section 2283 was deemed inapplicable in Dombrowski even though, when the
federal hearing was held, state proceedings had been commenced.
Whether a case is "in" a state court also depends upon what is considered
to be a part of a state judicial proceeding. Justice Brandeis stated an extremely
all-inclusive definition in Hill v. Martin:
The prohibition of [§ 2283) is against a stay of 'proceedings in any court
of a State.' That term is comprehensive. It includes all steps taken or which
may be taken in the state court by its officers from the institution to the close
of the final process. It applies to appellate as well as to original proceedings;
and is independent of the doctrine of res judicata. It applies alike to action by
the court and by its ministerial officers; applies not only to an execution issued
on a judgment, but to any proceeding supplemental or ancillary taken with a
view to making the suit or judgment effective. The prohibition is applicable
whether such supplementary or ancillary proceeding is taken in the court
which rendered the judgment or in some other."
This definition, difficult enough to apply to the variety of procedures in civil
actions, has been applied in criminal prosecutions with divergent results. One
court required that a formal indictment (or presumably an information) be
returned to commence a state criminal prosecution for the purposes of section
". Mississippi R.R. Comm'n v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 203 U.S. 335, 341 (1906); Engel-
man v. Cahn, 425 F.2d 954, 958 (2d Cir. 1969); Taylor v. Kentucky State Bar Ass'n, 424
F.2d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 1970); Geiger v. Jenkins, 316 F. Supp. 370, 372-73 (N.D. Ga.
1970), afl'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
138211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).
'S'Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 398 (1935).
14'Mississippi R.R. Comm'n v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 203 U.S. 335, 341 (1906).
141 One case recently so held. Geiger v. Jenkins, 316 F. Supp. 370, 372-73 (N.D. Ga.
1970), a/I'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
" See notes 111-13 supra, and accompanying text.
143296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935).
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2283.' Another held that it was sufficient if the matter had been docketed for
presentation to the grand jury and subpoenas issued to the witnesses.' Still
another court has held that an arrest suffices as a state court proceeding. "
(3) "Except as Expressly Authorized by Act of Congress." Even though the
general terms of the anti-injunction statute might otherwise apply, a court
must look to the statute relied upon by the plaintiff to determine if that act
of Congress "expressly authorizes" the issuance of an injunction against state
court proceedings. This particular language was inserted in lieu of a single
specific reference to the bankruptcy exception in the revision of 1948."'
The Atlantic Coast Line decision by the Supreme Court in 1971, which
held that the statute was jurisdictional and not a mere rule of comity, has
foreclosed an approach in the construction of this language that would permit
"flexibility supplied by judicial interpretation ... to meet the needs of our
expanding jurisprudence."'41 And the tenets of construction set down by the
Court leave little room, if any, for judicial "improvisation."'' Still, the statutory
exception need not specifically refer to section 2283;"5' indeed, most of the
recognized exceptions were passed prior to the 1948 revision. On the basis of
a review of the statutes that have been held to be exceptions to section 2283,
the following conclusions may be drawn: It is sufficient if the statute provides:
(1) that an injunction may be issued against state court proceedings;"' and
(2) that the statute allows a stay of any proceedings or otherwise requires
that all other proceedings cease."' Twelve statutes have been held to be ex-
ceptions to the anti-injunction statute: the interpleader provision;" the habeas
corpus statute;"4 the Bankruptcy Act;". the Frazier-Lemke Act;" the statute
limiting shipowners' liability;". the removal statutes;" 8 the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942;... the Fair Labor Standards Act;'"' the National Labor
'44McSurely v. Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Ky. 1967), appeal dismissed, 390 U.S.
412 (1968). See also Leslie v. Matzkin, 450 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1971).
"Davis v. Jury Comm'n, 261 F. Supp. 591 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
"Hartsville Theaters, Inc. v. Fox, 324 F. Supp. 258 (D.S.C. 1971). See also Brooks
v. Briley, 274 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967), aff'd, 391 U.S. 361 (1968).
'Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
'
48 Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 143 (1941) (dissenting opinion).
"'Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 514 (1955).
"' Id. at 516.
151The interpleader provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1970); see Toucey v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 133-34 (1941); Treines v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S.
66, 74 (1939); Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960);
and the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2251 (1970).
"2The Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 29(a) (1970) (Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. 5 2283
(1970)); the Frazier-Lemke Act, 11 U.S.C. § 203(s) (2) (1970) (Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308
U.S. 433 (1940)); and 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1970) (limiting shipowners' liability) (Provi-
dence & New York S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578 (1883); Beal v. Waltz, 309
F.2d 721, 724 (5th Cir. 1962)). See generally 314 U.S. at 133-34.
"328 U.S.C. § 2361 (1970); see note 151 supra.
15428 U.S.C. § 2251 (1970).
"'11 U.S.C. § 29(a) (1970); see note 152 supra.
150 11 U.S.C. 5 203(s) (2) (1970); see note 152 supra.
15746 U.S.C. § 185 (1970); see note 152 supra.
15828 U.S.C. 5 1441-50 (1970); see Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118,
133 (1941); French v. Hay, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250 (1874).
5950 U.S.C. § 901 (1970); see Porter v. Dicken, 328 U.S. 252 (1946); Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
'629 U.S.C. 55 202-08, 211-17 (1970); see Walling v. Black Diamond Coal Mining
Co., 59 F. Supp. 348, 351 (W.D. Ky. 1943).
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Relations Act; 1 the Public Utility Holding Act;1 ' the public accommodations
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;'" ' and the proxy provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'
Although the Supreme Court has not approved all of these holdings, both
the Court and the lower courts have occasionally indicated a tendency toward
a certain "flexibility" that has allowed some analysis of the relative importance
of the federal and state interests involved to creep into the construction prob-
lem in particular cases.'' This tendency, among other things, has enabled
some lower courts to hold that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (of the Civil Rights Act of
1871) is an express exception to section 2283.'" Other courts, however, have
held to the contrary,"' and the Supreme Court has left the question open on
several occasions." ' It is a little surprising that the Court has failed to pass
16129 U.S.C. § 141-87 (1970); see NLRB v. Bachelder, 120 F.2d 574 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 647 (1941).
12 15 U.S.C. § 79-79z-6 (1970); see Okin v. SEC, 161 F.2d 978, 980 (2d Cir. 1947).
10342 U.S.C. § 2000a to 2000h-6 (1970); see Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226, 230
(5th Cir. 1965).
N4 15 U.S.C. §5 78a to 78hh-1 (1970); see Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692
(2d Cir. 1966). In Studebaker the action was brought not by the SEC, but by a private
party, under the authority of J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), in which a
private right of action was implied from certain enforcement provisions and the purpose
of the Act.
"I For instance, in Porter v. Dicken, 328 U.S. 252 (1946), which dealt with the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, the Court discussed the purposes of the Act and
stated that it "was an implied legislative amendment to [section 2283], creating an excep.
tion to its broad prohibition." ld. at 254-55. And in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
314 U.S. 118 (1941), the Court recognized the shipowners' liability provision as an ex-
ception because it was a "'subsequent statute' to the Act of 1793." Id. at 133. See also
Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966), in which the court held that
"the policy of the anti-injunction statute is superseded by the need for immediate and
effective enforcement of federal securities regulations and statutes .... " Id. at 698. Of
course, it should be noted that Studebaker and other lower-court cases employing similar
reasoning may be completely discredited after Atlantic Coast Line. See Reaves & Golden,
supra note 90, at 305-07.
166Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1970); Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184
F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950); Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. La. 1971); Duke
v. Texas, 327 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Tex. 1971); Grove Press, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,
300 F. Supp. 281 (E.D. Pa.), modified, 418 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1969); Matzner v. Daven-
port, 288 F. Supp. 636 (D.N.J. 1968), af/'d per curiam, 410 F.2d 1376 (3d Cit. 1969);
Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Ill. 1968), rev'd sub nom. Boyle v. Landry, 401
U.S. 77 (1971); Dawkins v. Green, 285 F. Supp. 772 (N.D. Fla. 1968); Hooper v.
Gooding, 282 F. Supp. 624 (D. Ariz.), rev'd on other grounds, 394 F.2d 146 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 917 (1968).
1 7 Southern Ry. v. Chambers, 376 F.2d 815 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830
(1967); Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 939 (1964); Wojcik v. Palmer, 318 F.2d 171 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 930 (1963); Goss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 257 (7th Cit. 1963); Smith v. Village of
Lansing, 241 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1957); Sexton v. Barry, 233 F.2d 220 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 838 (1956); Norwood v. Parenteau, 228 F.2d 148 (8th Cit. 1955),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 955 (1956); Golden Dawn Shops, Inc. v. Department of Housing &
Urban Dev., 333 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Wheeler v. Adams Co., 322 F. Supp.
645 (D. Md. 1971); Entertainment Systems, Inc. v. Sedita, 319 F. Supp. 686 (W.D.N.Y.
1970); Baxter v. Ellington, 318 F. Supp. 1079 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); Grove Press, Inc. v.
Bailey, 318 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ala. 1970); Cholmakjian v. Board of Trustees, 315 F.
Supp. 1335 (W.D. Mich. 1970); Wilson v. Simon, 299 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ill. 1969);
Chinn v. Johnson, 294 F. Supp. 909 (S.D. Miss. 1969); Nichols v. Vance, 293 F. Supp.
680 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Mackay v. Nesbitt, 285 F. Supp. 498 (D. Alas. 1968); Brooks v.
Briley, 274 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967), a/I'd, 391 U.S. 361 (1968); Brock v. Schiro,
264 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. La. 1967); Chaffee v. Johnson, 229 F. Supp. 445 (S.D. Miss.
1964), a/I'd per curiam, 352 F.2d 514 (5th Cit. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 956 (1966);
Island S.S. Lines, Inc. v. Glennon, 178 F. Supp. 292 (D. Mass. 1959).
'
6 6 Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 92 S. Ct. 1113, 1124 (1972); Younger v. Harris,
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on this question in view of its obvious importance to the problem of balance
between the values of adequate protection of civil liberties and minimal inter-
ference with state functions."9
(4) "7Where Necessary in Aid of Its Jurisdiction, or To Protect or Effectuate
Its Judgments." This phraseology was also added in the revision of 1948."'
Clearly the purpose of the change was to codify the earlier judicially created
"res" and "relitigation" exceptions.171 The former exception was one of mani-
fest necessity and allowed a federal court that had attached the res in an in
rem or quasi in rem case to enjoin a state court from interfering with the res
and, hence, federal jurisdiction." The relitigation exception had allowed a
federal court to enjoin the relitigation in state court of a matter already de-
cided in federal court.' As applied in Dombrowski v. Pfister, the "necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction" exception would have allowed the federal trial court
to preserve the status quo pendente lite on the basis of a properly drawn com-
plaint. 74 The "protect or effectuate its judgments" provision clearly permits
injunctive relief against state court proceedings upon the rendering of a
declaratory or other judgment; provided, however, that no state court proceed-
ings were pending prior to the time that federal jurisdiction attached. 7" The
strictures of section 2283 may not be circumvented by first simply interfering
with a pending state court proceeding via declaratory relief, and then issuing
appropriate injunctive relief to "effectuate" the declaratory judgment. 7 '
II. FEDERALISM'S DELICATE BALANCE-THE PENDULUM SWINGS
A. The Younger Sextet
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (Brennan, White, Marshall, Stewart,
and Harlan, J]., concurring; Douglas, J., dissenting). After being charged
with a violation of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act,' the plaintiff
Harris sought injunctive relief in federal court to enjoin state officials from
prosecuting him under the Act. Intervenors Dan and Hirsch also alleged that
the Act "inhibited" their peaceful advocacy of the program of the Progressive
401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 613 n.3 (1968); Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 481 n.2 (1965).
19 See notes 413-20 infra, and accompanying text for post-Younger developments.
7
'See Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
... See id.; Reaves & Golden, supra note 90, at 303-04. However, this view on relitigation
cases was rejected by the majority opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Amalgamated Clothing
Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511 (1955). See D. CuRRIE, FEDERAL COURTS
559-62 (1968).
'2See Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1939); Lion
Bonding & Sur. Co. v. Karatz, 262 U.S. 77 (1923); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S.
226, 235 (1922); Palmer v. Texas, 212 U.S. 118, 125 (1909); Wabash R.R. v. Adelbert
College, 208 U.S. 38, 54 (1908); Hagan v. Lucas, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 400 (1836).
1 3 See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934); Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v.
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Looney v. Eastern Tex. Ry., 247 U.S. 214 (1918); Thom-
ason v. Cooper, 254 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1958); Jacksonville Blow Pipe Co. v. Recon-
struction Fin. Corp., 244 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1957); Jackson v. Carter Oil Co., 179 F.2d
524 (10th Cir. 1950).
"' See notes 111-12 supra, and accompanying text.
1' Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
"'See Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S.
1 (1970), and Babbitz v. McCann, 320 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Wis. 1970), vacated, 402
U.S. 903 (1971). See also Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 189, 194 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
17T CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400, 11401 (West 1970).
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Labor Party. Intervenor Broslawsky, a history instructor, alleged that the Act
and Harris' prosecution made him "uncertain" about whether he could present
material on Karl Marx or read from the Communist Manifesto. A three-judge
court was convened, and the defendants were enjoined from further prosecution
of Harris under the Act, which was held to be unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad.""
The Supreme Court, Justice Black writing the majority opinion, reversed the
judgment "as a violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts to
stay or enjoin pending state proceedings except under special circumstances. 179
First, the Court held that the intervenors did not have an "acute, live contro-
versy with the State and its prosecutor.""' The Court said that the intervenors
would have had standing if they could have alleged that they would have been
prosecuted for a certain planned course of conduct, but that an allegation that
they "feel inhibited" was insufficient to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the
federal courts. The Court explained: "A federal lawsuit to stop a prosecution
in a state court is a serious matter. And persons having no fears of state prose-
cution except those that are imaginary or speculative, are not to be accepted
as appropriate plaintiffs in such cases.""'' Because Harris was actually being
prosecuted by the defendant, the Court deemed him a proper party to invoke
federal equitable jurisdiction.
Part II of the Court's opinion contains a lengthy discussion of the role of
the notion of comity, or "Our Federalism,""... and general principles of equity
jurisprudence as forces of restraint on the exercise of federal equitable juris-
diction. In addition, the anti-injunction statute was cited as a manifestation
of a general congressional policy of federal nonintervention in the business of
state courts. The Court then turned to an analysis of the effect of Dombrowski
v. Pfister. Justice Black, not a participant in Dombrowski, recognized that that
opinion gave some credence to the position of the three-judge court below
that "the Dombrowski decision substantially broadened the availability of
injunctions against state criminal prosecutions and that under that decision
the federal courts may give equitable relief, without regard to any showing
of bad faith or harassment, whenever a state statute is found 'on its face' to
be vague or overly broad, in violation of the First Amendment.""' Justice
Black noted that a criminal prosecution under a statute regulating expression
may indeed "chill" the exercise of first amendment freedoms; nevertheless,
such a "chill" or inhibition alone will not justify federal intervention-and any
statements supporting such a contention in Dombrowski simply were "un-
necessary to the decision of that case, because the Court found that the plain-
tiffs had alleged a basis for equitable relief under the long-established stand-
ards."
84
Harris, then, having failed to allege bad faith or harassment, simply did
''281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
... 401 U.S. at 41.
10 Id.
"I Id. at 42.
"
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not state a case for equitable relief against a pending state criminal prosecu-
tion. Harris' remedy at law, the opportunity in the state proceeding to raise
constitutional objections and defenses, with ultimate federal review by certiorari
or habeas corpus, was thus deemed adequate even though not completely free
of cost, anxiety, and inconvenience. Having based its holding on considerations
of comity and equity, the Court did not reach issues raised by the anti-
injunction statute.8 '
Interestingly, Justice Black at the end of the opinion pointed out that "ex-
traordinary circumstances" might possibly exist in the absence of bad faith or
harassment. Quoting from Watson v. Buck,' he explained: "It is of course
conceivable that a statute might be flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in
whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply
it."8 ' The Justice then added cryptically that "[oither unusual situations call-
ing for federal intervention might also arise, but there is no point in our
attempting now to specify what they might be."'88
The concurring opinion of Justices Stewart and Harlan attempted to clarify
the limits of the Younger holding.9 The Justices noted that the Court did
not reach any questions relating to the independent operation of the anti-
injunction statute.9 ' Thus, notwithstanding the holding in Samuels v. Mack-
ell," ' the Court did not decide whether "injunction" in section 2283 should
be interpreted to include a declaratory judgment; nor did the Court reach the
question whether the Civil Rights Act of 1871 constitutes an express excep-
tion to section 2283.
Additionally, the Court, having dealt exclusively with state criminal pro-
ceedings, did not necessarily discuss relevant considerations for determining
federal court intervention with state civil proceedings. Justices Stewart and
Harlan pointed out that the intrusion upon state interests is probably milder
in the latter situation: "A State's decision to classify conduct as criminal pro-
vides some indication of the importance it has ascribed to prompt and un-
encumbered enforcement of its law. By contrast, the State might not even be a
party in a proceeding under a civil statute."'' 2 Finally, the Court did not pur-
port to speak to situations in which federal declaratory and injunctive relief
from future state criminal prosecutions is sought.'
Justice Douglas dissented,"'9 arguing that the need for a broad reading of
Domnbrowski was never greater than today "when enormous extrajudicial
sanctions are imposed on those who assert First Amendment rights in un-
"'Id. at 54. See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 55 (1971) (Stewart & Harlan,
Jj., concurring).189313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941).
111401 U.S. at 53-54.
"'1Id. at 54.
19Id. at 54-56.
' Id, at 55.191401 U.S. 66 (1971); see notes 199-208 infra.
192401 U.S. at 55 n.2. The Justices, however, further commented: "These considera-
tions would not, to be sure, support any distinction between civil and criminal proceedings
should the ban of 28 U.S.C. S 2283, which makes no such distinction, be held unaffected




popular causes."'" He was not only of the opinion that extraordinary circum-
stances necessitating federal injunctive relief exist anytime a facially uncon-
stitutional state statute is being enforced (even in good faith),"' but that the
injury to federal rights is greater when a criminal prosecution is pending under
such a statute than when the prosecution is merely threatened. 9 He would,
therefore, grant injunctive relief against the enforcement of a facially uncon-
stitutional state statute regardless of whether bad faith, harassment, or other
extraordinary circumstances were proved, or whether a state criminal pro-
ceeding was pending or merely threatened.
Justice Douglas would also hold that the anti-injunction statute is not a
bar to injunctive relief sought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871:
Whatever the balance of the pressures of localism and nationalism prior to
the Civil War, they were fundamentally altered by the war. The Civil War
Amendments made civil rights a national concern. Those Amendments, es-
pecially § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, cemented the change in American
federalism brought on by the war. Congress immediately commenced to use
its new powers to pass legislation. Just as the first Judiciary Act . . . and the
'anti-injunction' statute represented the early views of American federalism,
the Reconstruction statutes, including the enlargement of federal jurisdiction,
represent a later view of American federalism."
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (Douglas, Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Harlan, Jf., concurring). The plaintiffs were charged with violations of
the New York criminal anarchy laws."' Subsequently they sought federal
declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that, inter alia, the New York
laws were void for vagueness. The three-judge court held the laws constitu-
tional and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaints."' The Supreme Court affirmed,
but with slightly different reasoning, which did not purport to reach the con-
stitutionality of the statute.
The Court held that Younger controlled the injunction facet of the case as
well as the declaratory judgment question. On the basis of the considerations
of comity and equity discussed in Younger and the Court's 1943 opinion in
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, " the Court held that when state
criminal proceedings are pending prior to the filing of the federal complaint,
the same equitable considerations relevant to the propriety of an injunction
must be weighed in determining whether to grant declaratory relief-and
that when injunctive relief would be improper, declaratory relief should also
ordinarily be denied."' Justice Black explained the italicized qualification,
saying:
We do not mean to suggest that a declaratory judgment should never be
issued in cases of this type if it has been concluded that injunctive relief would
" 'Id. at 58.
196 Id. at 59.
"'Id. at 65.
"'Id. at 61.
"'NEW YORK PENAL LAW §§ 160-61, 163, 580(1), as amended, NEW YORK PENAL
LAW § 204.15, 105.00, 105.05, 105.10, 105.15 (McKinney 1967).
"'288 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
1'319 U.S. 293 (1943).
202 401 U.S. at 73.
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be improper. There may be unusual circumstances in which an injunction
might be withheld because, despite a plaintiff's strong claim for relief under
the established standards, the injunctive remedy seemed particularly intrusive
or offensive; in such a situation, a declaratory judgment might be appropriate
and might not be contrary to the basic equitable doctrines governing the avail-
ability of relief. Ordinarily, however, the practical effect of the two forms of
relief will be virtually identical, and the basic policy against federal inter-
ference with pending state criminal prosecutions will be frustrated as much
by a declaratory judgment as it would be by an injunction."3
The Great Lakes case concerned the question whether the Tax Injunction
Act of 1937, which in certain circumstances denied federal courts the power
to enjoin the "assessment, levy or collection of any [state] tax,"' also pro-
hibited federal declaratory relief. The Great Lakes Court noted that the issu-
ance of a declaratory judgment, though not prohibited by the terms of the Act,
"may in every practical sense operate to suspend collection of the state taxes
until the litigation is ended."' Relying on this reasoning, and with the added
distinction that a declaratory judgment followed by an injunction "to protect
or effectuate" that judgment might be used as a method of circumventing the
anti-injunction statute, the opinion of Justice Black effectively wedded the two
remedies. This opinion thus shows an intent, at least in pending-prosecution
situations,' " to severely undermine the distinctions of Zwickler v. Koota °'
The majority opinion affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaints, but
made the important distinction that dismissal should not have been upon the
merits-but rather upon the ground that plaintiffs failed to state a case for
equitable intervention! "
Justice Douglas concurred " on the basis that the plaintiffs apparently com-
mitted certain overt acts beyond the protection of the first amendment, and
that, therefore, "[ilt . . . cannot be said that the cases against [them] are
palpably unconstitutional." 1 *
Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall concurred in the result,11 relying
on Younger since there were pending criminal prosecutions against the plain-
tiffs, and because they did not allege bad faith harassment. For them, declara-
tory as well as injunctive relief was properly denied in such a situation.1 '
Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971) (Brennan, White, Marshall, Jf., concur-
ring; Douglas, J., dissenting). Seven groups of Negro residents of Chicago,
Illinois, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of
certain Chicago ordinances and Illinois statutes alleged to be unconstitutional.
The plaintiffs alleged: (1) that some of them were being prosecuted under
some of the statutes; (2) that the prosecutions under the statutes, including
30 Id.
2-428 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
205 319 U.S. at 299.
200 The Court expressed no view on the propriety of declaratory relief when no state
proceeding is pending. 401 U.S. at 73-74.
207 389 U.S. 241 (1967); see text accompanying notes 121-22 supra.
200401 U.S. at 73.
Id. at 74-75.
211Id. at 75.
211 Id. at 75-76.
212 See notes 225-30 infra, and accompanying text.
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arrests without probable cause and the setting of exorbitant bail, intimidated
Negroes in the exercise of first amendment rights; and (3) that the defend-
ants had threatened to enforce all the statutes for only one reason-to harass
and intimidate the plaintiffs. The three-judge court upheld the constitutionality
of all but two of the statutes. The court enjoined the defendants from enforcing
the two statutes in any manner against anyone. 13 The defendants appealed
only as to one of the two statutes, the criminal intimidation statute. 1'
After closely scrutinizing the plaintiffs' complaint, the Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded on the authority of Younger and Samuels. Although
some of the plaintiffs were being prosecuted under the other statutes, none
were being prosecuted or actually threatened with prosecution under the in-
timidation statute. The Court noted: "[TIhe complaint contains no mention
of any specific threat by any officer or official of Chicago, Cook County, or
the State of Illinois to arrest or prosecute any one or more of the plaintiffs
under that statute either one time or many times.""21 Piercing the allegations
in the complaint, the Court commented that it appeared that the plaintiffs
had searched the statutes and city ordinances in order to select those most likely
to be enforced in bad faith against them."' The Court characterized the plain-
tiffs' allegations as "flimsy" and "speculation about the future," and concluded
that none of the plaintiffs would be likely to incur irreparable injury if the
state were left free to enforce the intimidation statute.
Justice Douglas repeated his view that when a facially unconstitutional
statute is involved, no bad faith, harassment, or other irreparable injury is
necessary to justify federal intervention, and that the anti-injunction statute
is no bar to relief. He also took issue with the majority's reading of the plain-
tiffs' complaint. 1 ' Justice Douglas found the plaintiffs' allegations sufficient
to create a case or controversy and invoke federal equitable powers, since the
plaintiffs claimed that the intimidation statute was one of many statutes being
used to harass their group.
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971) (Stewart and Blackmun, IJ., concur-
ring; Brennan, White, and Marshall, If., concurring and dissenting; Douglas,
I., dissenting in part). Ledesma and the other plaintiffs, operators of allegedly
"obscene" newsstands, were charged with two violations of a Louisiana statute1
and two violations of a St. Bernard Parish ordinance.' The plaintiffs then
sought federal declaratory and injunctive relief against the state statute and also
sought a declaratory judgment that the parish ordinance was unconstitutional.
A three-judge court held the statute constitutional, but concluding that the
arrests and seizures in the case were unlawful, the court entered an order pro-
hibiting the state's use of any materials so obtained and further ordered that
all such material be returned to the plaintiffs. In addition, even though the
2"' Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. I1. 1968).214 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-6 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
"15401 U.S. at 81.
214 Id.
2171 d. at 63-65.
218 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. S 14-106 (Supp. 1970).
2
'
9 ST. BERNARD PARISH, LA., ORDINANCES 21-60 (1971).
[Vol. 26
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
three-judge court had no jurisdiction over the ordinance question, the court
voiced an opinion that the ordinance was unconstitutional, and that opinion
was incorporated by reference in the single judge's judgment.2"
On direct appeal the Supreme Court relied on Stefanelli v. Minard,"' a
1951 case, to reverse the judgment enjoining the state officials from using any
unlawfully seized materials in the state prosecution and requiring their return.
The court emphasized that absent proven harassment or bad faith by state
officials or other extraordinary circumstances, the plaintiffs' rights were ade-
quately protected by raising constitutional objections or defenses in the state
proceedings, with "review by certiorari or appeal in this Court or, in a proper
case, on federal habeas corpus"" should the state courts fail to resolve con-
stitutional issues correctly.
As to the declaratory judgment invalidating the parish ordinance, the Court
was of the opinion that it had no jurisdiction on direct appeal to review the
judgment of the single district judge. But in dictum the Court said: "There is
considerable question concerning the propriety of issuing a declaratory judg-
ment against a criminal law in the circumstances of this case."' The Court
explained that Samuels would dictate the nonissuance of a declaratory judg-
ment, because "[alt the time the instant federal court suit was filed, there was
pending in Louisiana state court a criminal prosecution under the parish ordi-
nance.
In his dissent Justice Brennan viewed the ordinance questions differently
and took issue with the Court on two points. He would have held: (1) that
the Court had jurisdiction over the direct appeal from the judgment declaring
the parish ordinance unconstitutional;' and (2) that when the defendants
entered a nolle prosequi in the state court on the ordinance counts, no prose-
cution under the ordinance was "pending" under the Younger holding." '
22304 F. Supp. 662, 670 n.31 (E.D. La. 1969).
221 342 U.S. 117 (1951). In Stefanelli the Court refused to enjoin the use of illegally
obtained evidence in a state criminal prosecution. The majority opinion, written by Justice
Frankfurter, expressed a particular aversion to this type of federal intervention:
The consequences of exercising the equitable power here invoked are not
the concern of a merely doctrinaire alertness to protect the proper sphere of
the States in enforcing their criminal law. If we were to sanction this inter-
vention, we would expose every State criminal prosecution to insupportable
disruption. Every question of procedural due process of law-with its far-flung
and undefined range-would invite a flanking movement against the system
of State courts by resort to the federal forum, with review if need be to this
Court, to determine the issue. Asserted unconstitutionality in the impaneling
and selection of the grand and petit juries, in the failure to appoint counsel,
in the admission of a confession, in the creation of an unfair trial atmosphere,
in the misconduct of the trial court-all would provide ready opportunities,
which conscientious counsel might be bound to employ, to subvert the or-
derly, effective prosecution of local crime in local courts. To suggest these
difficulties is to recognize their solution.
Id. at 123-24.
21401 U.S. at 85.
123 Id. at 85-86.
l'Id. at 86 n.2.225 Id. at 93-130.
1 Id. at 98-102.2 7 Id. at 103-04:
The key predicate to answering the question whether a federal court should
stay its hand is whether there is a pending state prosecution where the federal
court plaintiff may have his constitutional defenses heard and determined.
1972]
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Thus, Justice Brennan reached the question left unanswered in Younger: Is
federal intervention appropriate when no state prosecution is pending, but
the plaintiff cannot prove bad faith enforcement or harassment or other extra-
ordinary circumstances? After tracing the history and purposes of the Declara-
tory Judgment Acte- and noting that declaratory relief is a much milder in-
trusion upon the state than injunctive relief, 9 Justice Brennan concluded that
as long as the requirements of standing are satisfied and the case otherwise is
proper for such relief, declaratory relief should be accorded to persons if there
are no pending state proceedings, even in the absence of bad faith, harassment,
or other great and immediate irreparable injury. Therefore, the "chill" neces-
sary to elicit declaratory relief is much less than that required for injunctive
relief, and since Samuels spoke only to situations in which state proceedings
are pending, this lesser chill will sanction federal intervention in the form of
a declaratory judgment."'
Justice Douglas agreed with the majority that the Court had no jurisdiction
to review the ordinance questions, but he dissented from the reversal of the
supression order for the same reasons stated in his Younger dissent."
Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971) (per curiam) (Brennan, Marshall, White,
I]., concurring; Douglas, J., dissenting). In probably the most extreme re-
versal in the Younger sextet, the Supreme Court reached out to overturn the
decision of a Texas three-judge court. The plaintiff Stein, a publisher of a
Dallas underground newspaper, was arrested and charged under the Texas
obscenity law"2 with the possession of obscene materials. Stein then sought
federal declaratory and injunctive relief. In addition, he alleged that the Dallas
police had unconstitutionally searched his offices and seized certain materials
without prior judicial determination that the materials were obscene. The three-
Ordinarily, that question may be answered merely by examining the dates
upon which the federal and state actions were filed. If the state prosecution
was first filed and if it provides an adequate forum for the adjudication of
constitutional rights, the federal court should not ordinarily intervene. When,
however, as here, at the time of the federal hearing there is no state prose-
cution to which the federal court plaintiff may be relegated for the assertion
of his constitutional defense, the primary reason for refusing intervention is
absent. Here, there was no other forum for the adjudication of appellees'
constitutional objections to the ordinance.
2828 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
"' Justice Brennan quoted from a House committee report on the proposed operation
of the Act: "The principle involved in this form of procedure is to confer upon the courts
the power to exercise in some instances preventive relief, a function now performed rather
clumsily by our equitable proceedings and inadequately by the law courts." 401 U.S. at
111-12, quoting H.R. REP. No. 1264, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
230 This history compels rejection of the Court's suggestion . . . that although
no informations were pending at the time of the hearing, declaratory relief
was inappropriate in the absence of a showing 'that appellees would suffer
irreparable injury of the kind necessary to justify federal injunctive inter-
ference with the state criminal processes.' Congress expressly rejected that
limitation and to engraft it upon the availability of the congressionally pro-
vided declaratory remedy is simply judicial defiance of the congressional
mandate. It is nothing short of judicial repeal of the statute. If the statute is
to be repealed or rewritten, it must be done by Congress, not this Court.
Id. at 115-16.
2311Id. at 90-93. See notes 194-98 supra, and accompanying text.231TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 527, § 1 (1952), as amended, TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.
art. 527, §5 1-13 (Supp. 1972).
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judge court declined to pass on this particular contention, because it was not
an attack upon the constitutionality of a statute. The court considered only the
question whether the statute was unconstitutional on its face. Finding the
statute's definition of obscenity constitutionally inadequate, the court declared
the statute unconstitutional and issued appropriate injunctive relief." The Su-
preme Court reversed and remanded in light of Younger and Samuels for a
determination of whether there was bad faith or harassment on the part of the
prosecution as a precondition to equitable relief. Justices Brennan and Marshall
concurred, but stressed that if the plaintiff's allegations of bad faith and harass-
ment were proved, federal intervention would be justified.'
In dissenting,' Justice Douglas argued that because the Court may deal with
plain error, it should have invalidated the statute and thus "put an end to the
lawless raids under it."' Additionally, the Justice stated that the Texas ob-
scenity statute was "flagrantly and patently unconstitutional" under the Young-
er example of "extraordinary circumstances" other than bad faith or harass-
ment."7 Also, Justice Douglas noted that the plaintiff sought injunctive relief
against future prosecutions only, and that the anti-injunction statute did not
bar relief. " The Justice added that "[i]f Zwickler v. Koota . . . means any-
thing, it means that [declaratory] relief can also be granted." '
Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971) (per curiam) (Stewart and Harlan,
]J., concurring; Brennan, White, and Marshall, ]f., dissenting; Douglas, J.,
took no part in the decision). The plaintiffs, owners and operators of a motion
picture theater, were charged with violating a Massachusetts law prohibiting
the possession of obscene films for the purpose of exhibition.' They sought
federal declaratory and injunctive relief. On the request for a preliminary
injunction the three-judge district court found: (1) that the plaintiffs had a
probability of success on the merits; (2) that abstention was improper; and
(3) that because the defendant would likely be immune from any award of
money damages, because the plaintiffs were likely to sustain a loss in box
office receipts, and because other persons would probably be inhibited by the
prosecution of the plaintiffs, imminent irreparable injury had been established.
Accordingly, the court preliminarily enjoined the imposition of sentence in
the pending proceeding and all future prosecutions under the statute. 1 The
Supreme Court vacated and remanded in the light of Younger and Samuels.
The Court pointed out that the three-judge court made no finding that the
threat to the plaintiffs' first amendment rights is "one that cannot be eliminated
by [their] defense against a single criminal prosecution. '
Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented, arguing that the district
" Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
234401 U.S. 200, 204 (1971).
2,3 Id. at 204-15.
230 Id. at 207.
" See note 187 supra.2 401 U.S. at 211.
2 3
9 Id.
°MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 28A (1970).
241306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969).
401 U.S. at 220.
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court decision should be reversed. 43 The Justices effectively distinguished their
concurring positions to remand in Dyson on the basis that here the plaintiffs
failed to show any evidence of bad faith, harassment, or other extraordinary
circumstances, whereas in Dyson the plaintiff had alleged bad faith and harass-
ment but the three-judge court thought it irrelevant. They noted that under
Freedman v. Maryland" a federal court should preserve the status quo only
for the shortest, fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution of a
film's alleged obscenity. In Byrne the defendant had agreed to refrain from
any seizures of the film or interference with its exhibition pending the outcome
of the trial. Since under Freedman a federal injunction to preserve the status
quo could extend no further than the state trial court's decision of the obscene
character of the film, the injunction issued by the three-judge court prohibiting
the defendant from interfering with future showings of the film was im-
proper."
B. The Sextets Limiting Construction of Dombrowski
The message from the Supreme Court's February sextet is clear: After
Dombrowski the pendulum of federal intervention in state court proceedings
swung too far; it is time for a new balance to be struck.' The new balance
finds a substantially restricted Dombrowski doctrine operating in an atmos-
phere designed to encourage the most friction-free federal-state relationship.
Although many questions remain for the lower courts after the Younger series
concerning the precise future of Dombrowski and other theories of equitable
relief in the federal courts, the sextet itself settled beyond dispute certain
ambiguities of Dombrowski.
(1) The Dombrowski doctrine does not permit federal injunctive relief
against pending state proceedings brought to enforce an unconstitutionally
vague or overbroad statute regulating expression in the absence of a showing
of bad faith prosecution, harassment, or other extraordinary circumstances.
(2) The Dombrowski doctrine does not confer standing to challenge a
state statute regulating expression upon those whose only injury or threat of
injury is a general feeling of inhibition derived from the mere presence of an
unconstitutional law on the books.
(3) Notwithstanding any implication from Zwickler v. Koota, if state
court proceedings are pending and federal injunctive relief would not be
warranted because of a lack of extraordinary circumstances, declaratory relief
is also improper.
III. THE YOUNGER SEXTET AND THE LOWER COURTS
A. Standing
The Younger series of cases left no doubt that plaintiffs' allegations of stand-
ing to attack state statutes are to be closely examined. In Boyle in particular
the Court effectively pierced the plaintiffs' allegations of harassment, which
21 Id. at 220-21.
2"380 U.S. 51 (1965).
2401 U.S. at 221.
' See note 433 infra, and accompanying text.
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though facially adequate, were found to be fatally conclusionary. In Younger
the Court denied standing to the intervenors, neither of whom had been
threatened with prosecution or had shown that their planned course of con-
duct clearly came within the ambit of the state statute. In both Boyle and
Younger the Court has impliedly ordered the lower courts to apply the skepti-
cism of common-law pleading in reading complaints. This skepticism applies
not only when injunctive relief is sought against pending state criminal pro-
ceedings, but includes threatened action as well. 7 The dilemma thus posed by
the Court is a difficult one for the aspiring plaintiff. Assuming he has a choice,
he can opt for the "pending-prosecution" route, which assures standing but
imposes the burden of showing bad faith prosecution, harassment, or other
extraordinary circumstances and may ultimately impale him on section 2283;
or he can choose the "threatened prosecution" route, which risks a "no stand-
ing" ruling, but may avoid some of the Younger prerequisites for injunctive
relief and gain him declaratory relief.' Despite this forced venture on a
treacherous and somewhat uncharted sea, some plaintiffs have successfully
"passed between Scylla and Charybdis."'
In Park 'N Fly of Texas, Inc. v. City of Houstone' the plaintiff successfully
challenged the constitutionality of an ordinance regulating the access of com-
mercial and other vehicles to the intercontinental airport area. The ordinance
provided for certain penal sanctions as well as the possible loss of a permit
to operate upon its violation. Because the ordinance proscribed particular ac-
tivity and the plaintiffs clearly intended to pursue that activity,"5 the single-
judge district court was satisfied that standing existed on the simple inference
that "it is ... unlikely that the City Council would not take action to penalize
a violator of the ordinance in question."'"
247 In a Younger footnote Justice Black made some interesting standing observations
with respect to cases in which injunctive relief is sought against proceedings for the en-
forcement of state statutes regulating expression that are alleged to be facially unconstitu-
tional. The Justice noted that in first amendment vagueness or overbreadth cases standing
requirements had been relaxed to allow constitutional challenges in the absence of any
showing that the defendant's conduct could not be regulated by some properly drawn
statute. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940). Justice Black distinguished the standing problem from the issue of the propriety
of injunctive relief: Injunctive relief has been granted not when the statute was merely
facially vague or overbroad, but only when "the statute was held to be vague or overly
broad as construed and applied to a particular case. If the statute had been too vague as
written, but sufficiently narrow as applied, prosecutions and convictions under it would
ordinarily have been permissible." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 48 n.4 (1971), citing
Dombrowski. Thus, a plaintiff may have standing to challenge a vague or overbroad
statute, but if his conduct is "hardcore," he is not eligible to receive injunctive relief. Also,
abstention may be warranted. See notes 49, 52 supra.
4" Whether the stringent Younger standard will be applied to cases in which the prose-
cution is merely threatened-a question expressly reserved by the Supreme Court-is, of
course, unclear. The issue has been squarely faced by the First and Fifth Circuits with di-
ametrically opposite results. See notes 392-401 intra, and accompanying text. Still, it would
seem that a plaintiff's odds for federal injunctive relief are better if his prosecution is
merely imminent, not pending.
-4 Mitchell Family Planning, Inc. v. City of Royal Oak, 335 F. Supp. 738, 741 (E.D.
Mich. 1972).
11327 F. Supp. 910 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
2'See Gall v. Lawler, 322 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D. Wis. 1971), in which a previous
prosecution of a similarly situated individual clearly indicated the applicability of the statute
to and the likelihood of enforcement against the defendant.
327 F. Supp. at 919 n.5. Noting that there appeared to be no adequate state court
1972)
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An easier case was Mitchell Family Planning, Inc. v. City of Royal Oak."8
There the plaintiffs placed information concerning free abortion clinics on a
billboard in violation of an ordinance prohibiting the advertisement of such
information. They were notified by city authorities that they would be pros-
ecuted unless the advertising was removed, and the plaintiffs won the race to
the courthouse.
In Anderson v. Vaughn..4 the plaintiff apparently wanted to make some
expressive use of a Viet Cong flag. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the enforcement of a Connecticut statute making it a criminal offense
to carry or display "a red flag or any other emblem as a symbol calculated to,
or which may, incite people to disorders or breaches of the law."25 Although
the plaintiff was unable to show that he had actually been threatened with
prosecution under the statute, the court noted that there had been several
recent arrests under the statute and that "[viarious defendants and other law
enforcement officials have otherwise indicated their intention to enforce the
statute so long as it remains in force." ' Relying heavily on Justice Brennan's
dissent in Perez, the court refused to force the plaintiff to violate the statute,
and held that there existed the requisite case or controversy."'
A large number of post-Younger cases, however, were dismissed in whole
or in part for lack of standing after an analysis of the standing discussions in
the sextet. " ' Most of these decisions were not surprising, although some of the
dismissals are difficult to distinguish from the grant of relief in the Viet Cong
flag case, Anderson v. Vaughn. Usually the plaintiffs simply failed to prove
the threat of prosecution beyond a "fear of reprisals"" or other inhibitions."'
Attempted class actions often failed because the primary plaintiff, who had
standing, could not prove the requisite extraordinary circumstances, and the
remedy and that the plaintiffs would likely suffer both great and immediate irreparable
harm, the court enjoined enforcement of the ordinance. Id. at 918, 927.
21 335 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
...327 F. Supp. 101 (D. Conn. 1971).
sCh. 35, [1919) Conn. Laws 2703 (repealed Oct. 1, 1971).
...327 F. Supp. at 102.
"'In another Connecticut case, Thorns v. Smith, 334 F. Supp. 1203 (D. Conn. 1971),
the plaintiff and his class of 37 persons alleged that they intended to "misuse" the American
flag as a means of expressing their opposition to certain aspects of the foreign policy of
the United States. Indicating that his counsel was aware of possible standing problems in
the challenge of the Connecticut "misuse-of-the-flag" statute, the plaintiff wrote letters to
the ultimate defendants in the case in which he advised them of his plan to wear a vest
made from an American flag. He asked them to give him a prior indication of their prose-
cutorial stance with regard to such conduct. Three of the defendants did not answer the
plaintiff's letters, one stated his intent to enforce the statute, but expressed some doubt
about whether the plaintiff's conduct would violate the statute, and the fifth responded:
"[G)o ahead and do it, and, . . . if you're in violation of the statute we'll lock you up."
Id. at 1207. Again relying on Justice Brennan's concurring and dissenting opinion in Perez,
the court held that the plaintiffs had standing.
2'See, e.g., Manns v. Koontz, 451 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Musick
v. Jonsson, 449 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Becker v. Thompson, 334 F.
Supp. 1386 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, Civil No. 71-1856 (5th Cir. May 3, 1972); Karp v.
Collins, 333 F. Supp. 15 (D.N.J. 1971) (per curiam); Landreth v. Hopkins, 331 F. Supp.
920 (N.D. Fla. 1971); Conover v. Montemuro, 328 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Nelson, 327 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Ariz. 1971); Fuller v. Scott,
328 F. Supp. 842 (M.D.N.C. 1971) (per curiam).
2"See, e.g., Musick v. Jonsson, 449 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
211 See, e.g., Karp v. Collins, 333 F. Supp. 15 (D.N.J. 1971) (per curiam).
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class of unprosecuted persons was not sufficiently threatened to give rise to
an actual case or controversy."'
Two cases involving challenges to state abortion laws stand in contrast to
the relief granted to abortion advertisers in Mitchell Family Planning, Inc. v.
City of Royal Oak. In Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Nelson"' the association,
a doctor, and a married couple alleged that they were prevented from per-
forming certain acts for fear of prosecution under Arizona abortion statutes.
They did not allege the performance of any acts prohibited by the statutes, nor
did they allege that they intended to perform any such acts. Thus, as opposed
to the plaintiffs in Mitchell, who risked prosecution by advertising in violation
of an ordinance, the Nelson plaintiffs attacked only the "bare wording of the
statutes rather than ... any attempt or threat of enforcement of statutes which
plaintiffs express no intention of violating. '
The second case, Landreth v. Hopkins,"' may be even more indicative of the
uses to which the Younger series will be put on standing issues. The Florida
plaintiffs in Landreth were active participants in abortion counseling and re-
ferred counselees who desired abortions to an abortion clinic in New York.
The defendant district attorney had investigated the plaintiffs' activities to de-
termine if there were any violations of Florida law and had turned his infor-
mation over to the grand jury for their judgment. At the time of the federal
court hearing the grand jury had not acted, and although the defendant could
have charged the plaintiffs via an information, he did not do so. The court
cited Younger and Watson v. Buck' and concluded that the threat of prose-
cution was not sufficiently imminent to constitute a concrete case ripe for
decision.
The Landreth decision, which relied heavily upon Younger's standing em-
phasis, indicates that sometimes, and perhaps often, a plaintiff will not have
standing until there is also a prosecution pending against him. Thus, because
an indictment is usually deemed to be a state court proceeding within Younger
and section 2283, it appears that the Landreth court has required the plaintiffs
to impale themselves upon the "pending prosecution" horn of the standing
dilemma. The only apparent difference between Mitchell and Landreth is that
in Mitchell the prosecutor was zealous and in Landreth relatively timid.
B. Pending Prosecutions
Younger and its companion cases spoke only to the propriety of federal
injunctive relief against pending state criminal prosecutions. But the Court's
broad reliance upon the concept of American federalism has given some lower
courts the green light to extend the sextet's principles to situations not neces-
sarily controlled by the actual holdings of the cases. Several questions can be
raised. For example: What type of state proceeding is "a state criminal prose-
cution"? Does a suit which is technically a civil suit qualify? If the pending
"
1 See, e.g., Manns v. Koontz, 451 F.2d 1344 (4th Cit. 1971) (per curiam); Karp
v. Collins, 333 F. Supp. 15 (D.N.J. 1971) (per curiam); Conover v. Montemuro, 328 F.
Supp. 994 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
327 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Ariz. 1971).8 Id. at 1292.
64331 F. Supp. 920 (N.D. Fla. 1971).
265313 U.S. 387 (1941).
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state proceeding involves different parties from the federal court plaintiffs, do
the same restraints apply? If the state proceeding is begun after the federal
suit is filed, are the considerations the same?
A trilogy of cases decided by a Wisconsin single-judge court may fore-
shadow a civil-criminal approach to the determination of what type of pending
state proceeding triggers the application of the principles of the February
sextet. All three cases represented official attempts to eliminate "topless"
dancing in Wisconsin nightclubs. In Pederson v. Brier" state officials placed
criminal charges against certain entertainers and proprietors of nightclubs for
violations of the state disorderly conduct statute. However, in Marseo v.
Cannone7 state's attorneys instituted civil proceedings against similarly situated
defendants to abate the alleged topless violations under state statutes declaring
"Bawdyhouses" and "Disorderly houses" to be nuisances. And in McCue v. City
of Racine and Ruetz v. Huck,"s consolidated cases, city officials sought to
enjoin "nude and semi-nude" dancing under city ordinances prohibiting dis-
orderly conduct and establishing a "dress code" for dancers. The defendants
in these cases sought federal declaratory and injunctive relief.
Pederson was disposed of summarily; there state officials brought suits in
state court under state criminal statutes. The court dismissed when it found
none of Younger's strictures extended to all situations in which civil proceed-
ings were pending. However, because the state abatement statutes provided
for the action to be brought in the name of the state, and because the proceed-
ing was a kind of equitable remedy against criminal conduct, the court held
that the civil proceeding was within "the intended reach and scope of the
policy announced in the Younger cases."" 9 In the third set of cases, McCue and
Ruetz, city officials sought to enforce city ordinances through civil injunction
proceedings in city courts. The federal court distinguished Pederson and Marseo
as being state criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings respectively, and then
issued temporary restraining orders against the city officials."' °
In Berryhill v. Gibson7" an Alabama three-judge federal court purported
to apply the principles of Younger in determining the propriety of interfering
with State Board of Optometry proceedings to revoke licenses. The court did
so realizing that the Younger opinions themselves indicated their possible
nonapplicability in civil cases, and that the prohibition of section 2283 does
not apply to pending state administrative proceedings. 7 ' Nevertheless, the
court found the requisite extraordinary circumstances under Younger sufficient
to justify federal intervention.
Two cases, however, flatly rejected any interpretation of the sextet that
would extend the rule that courts of equity have a "great reluctance" to in-
terfere with state criminal proceedings to situations involving state civil pro-
' 327 F. Supp. 1382 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
.. 7326 F. Supp. 1315 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
268330 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
169326 F. Supp. at 1317.
270 It is not clear from the opinion whether the civil actions were pending or merely
threatened, but the court did not indicate that any such distinctions would be made.
"' 331 F. Supp. 122 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (hearing before Alabama State Board of Op-
tometry enjoined).
27 2See note 137 supra.
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ceedings."72 Both Duke v. Texas,274 which struck down a state court injunction
prohibiting campus demonstrations, and Hobbs v. Thompson,"' which invali-
dated a city ordinance prohibiting political activity of firemen, cited the con-
curring opinion of Justices Stewart and Harlan in Younger. Those concur-
rences pointed out that for various reasons the delicate balance of federalism
might be struck differently when a federal court is asked to intervene in state
civil proceedings." ' Thus, Duke concluded that the applicable standards for
determining the propriety of injunctive relief when state civil proceedings are
pending are simply the traditional restraints of equity-inadequate remedy at
law and irreparable injury."' However, a recent dissent by Justice White, in
which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun concurred, indicated that
the principles of Younger are applicable when state civil suits are pending.7 '
When there is a pending state criminal proceeding against one defendant,
but a different plaintiff brings the federal injunction suit, do the Younger re-
straints apply? The ancestor of this issue was first raised and partially answered
in the 1943 decision, Douglas v. City of Jeannette."' The federal plaintiffs in
Douglas were Jehovah's Witnesses who brought a class action challenging the
constitutionality of an anti-solicitation ordinance. A criminal prosecution under
the ordinance was pending against other Jehovah's Witnesses, and the Court in
dictum indicated that those in privity with the state defendants (the federal
court plaintiffs) should not be allowed to collaterally challenge the ordinance!"
Thus, this dictum might seem to require, at least in some circumstances, that
the rights of those similarly situated with the state defendant be protected by
him in a kind of representative capacity in the pending criminal proceeding-
even though many situations suggest themselves in which this protection would
be illusory. However, by not basing its decision in Douglas on this ground,
the Court left open the possibility that the rights of those similarly situated
with the state defendant can be used as a basis for federal court intervention.
Thus, lawyers representing groups of people would be able to escape the "pend-
ing prosecution" bar to federal injunctive relief under Younger.
The court in Wulp v.. Corcoran"i acknowledged the problem, but would not
attempt an answer: "We express no opinion on the propriety of federal re-
lief when there is no state proceeding pending against any of the plaintiffs
bringing the action in federal court, but a state prosecution under the chal-
lenged statute has begun against an unrelated third party."'
272 Other cases have held that Younger's principles apply to pending juvenile proceed-
ings. North v. Greene, Civil No. 413-71 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Kinney v. Lenon, 447 F.2d
596 (9th Cir. 1971). The former case also held that the courts of the District of Columbia
are, for the purposes of federal injunctive relief against state proceedings, analogous to state
courts.
274327 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Tex. 1971).
217448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971).
.
7 See note 192 supra.
277 327 F. Supp. at 1234. But because the court found "great and immediate irreparable
harm" under Younger's test, this is technically dictum.
2 Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 92 S. Ct. 1113, 1124 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
278 319 U.S. 157 (1943). In such a situation the anti-injunction statute has been held
inapplicable. Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375 (1939).
°319 U.S. at 164-65.
.81454 F.2d 826 (1st Cir. 1972).
" Id. at 832 n.8.
19721
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Of the four courts hinting at an answer to this question two demonstrated
an overriding concern for the complete protection of the federal plaintiffs,
and two seemed to be more concerned with the effect federal declaratory or
injunctive relief might have on the pending state prosecutions. In Scott v. Frey
when the unprosecuted owner of seized, allegedly obscene films sought a federal
order for their return, relief was denied since "[tjo order a return of the films
seized while state criminal prosecutions are pending against two of plaintiffs'
employees would ...be a most unwarranted interference with the orderly
procedure and operation of the state criminal process."'" In Karp v. Collins..4
several plaintiffs challenged a statute while one of them was being prosecuted
under it in state court. Although the court doubted the standing of the unprose-
cuted plaintiffs, it added: "Moreover, since the prosecution of Tomashevsky
under the statutes is pending, the effect of a judgment in this proceeding in-
validating the statute would be no less an interference with that prosecution
because granted at the behest of co-plaintiffs rather than Tomashevsky him-
self."
On the other hand, a different emphasis, if not authority, is found in Lewis
v. Kugler."' In Lewis ten plaintiffs, who had been charged with violations on
the basis of allegedly unlawful searches and seizures, and seventeen plaintiffs,
who had not been charged, joined in a federal injunction suit. Their suit
claimed it was unconstitutional for New Jersey troopers to stop cars for
searches without probable cause. The plaintiffs asserted that often the troopers
stopped cars simply because "long hairs" were driving. On the basis of Stefan-
elli v. Minard"7 the court refused to enter suppression orders with respect to
the fruits of the allegedly illegal seizures. But as to the seventeen unprosecuted
plaintiffs, the court was of the opinion that Younger and Samuels did not pre-
clude declaratory and injunctive relief upon a proper showing that a substan-
tial threat of constitutional violations existed. 8
The case most closely analogous to Douglas v. City of Jeannette is Thorns
v. Smith." The plaintiff and his class in Thorns had been subjected to threat-
ened prosecution under the Connecticut "misuse-of-the-flag" statute. Contem-
poraneously with the federal suit, the state intermediate appellate court affirmed
the conviction of one Van Camp under the statute. A petition for certification
to the state supreme court had been filed. The court in Thorns held that "[ble-
cause there is no prosecution pending against Thoms or the class he represents,
Younger is inapplicable and imposes no bar to our consideration of the
merits."' The court reasoned that Van Camp was
neither the plaintiff nor a member of plaintiff's class. Plaintiff represents those
213330 F. Supp. 365, 368 (E.D. La. 1971).
284333 F. Supp. 15 (D.N.J. 1971).
2 1Id. at 17.
21446 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1971).
287342 U.S. 117 (1951). See notes 134-36 supra, and accompanying text.
28 A distinction has been made between injunctive relief that indirectly interferes with
a pending state court proceeding and that which directly interferes. See G.I. Distribs.,
Inc. v. Murphy, 336 F. Supp. 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp.
1107 (S.D. Fla. 1971); notes 362-63 infra.
288334 F. Supp. 1203 (D. Conn. 1971).28 Id. at 1206.
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with similar sentiments whose desire to express those sentiments in the manner
described is chilled by threatened prosecution under the statute. The very fact
of Van Camp's arrest and prosecution precludes him from being similarly
situated.
The prosecutions which the Court in Younger held sufficient to preclude
federal intervention were those pending against the federal plaintiff himself.
Indeed, an underlying basis for the Court's decision was that the federal plain-
tiff had a present state forum 'affording [him] an opportunity to raise his
constitutional claims.' . . . Mr. Justice Brennan, in his separate opinion in
Perez made it abundantly clear that it was the present federal plaintiff who
must have the available state forum provided by a pending prosecution ...
The prosecution pending against Van Camp cannot provide an 'existent,
concrete opportunity to secure vindication of [Thoms'] constitutional claims.'
•.. It cannot, therefore, serve as a basis for invoking the doctrine of Younger
and its companions."'
The dissenting judge in Thorns argued that Younger's stricter standard of
irreparable injury applied, and that under that standard relief was not justi-
fied. He explained:
During this litigation, there was an appeal pending by a different litigant in
the Connecticut Supreme Court by reason of a conviction under the same Con-
necticut flag desecration statute. The latter appeal raised the same first amend-
ment arguments as were presented by plaintiffs here. While this parallel state
litigation did not involve the same parties, it is submitted that the rationale
of Younger is nonetheless dispositive. A declaratory judgment by this Court
to the effect that the Connecticut statute unconstitutionally infringes upon
first amendment freedoms, effectively 'stops' the orderly adjudication of these
very same claims in the pending state appellate proceeding.
The 'vital consideration' of comity . . . is emasculated in this decision where
a federal court, with no showing of the kind of 'great and immediate' irrepara-
ble injury enunciated by the Supreme Court in Younger decides the very issue
being litigated, at the time of the argument of this suit, in the State Supreme
Court. Absent a showing of irreparable injury, it is submitted that a balance
between the comity considerations articulated by the Supreme Court in Young-
er and the notion that this particular plaintiff should be entitled to be heard
in a judicial forum without subjecting himself to criminal liability in order
to do so, must be struck here in favor of allowing the state appellate court to
adjudicate the pending constitutional issues free from federal court inter-
f erence.92
Significantly, the petition for certification of the state defendant, Van Camp,
was denied by the state supreme court after the Thomas hearing."' Although
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was still a theoretical possibility
for Van Camp,' the plaintiff in Thorns was not put through such burdens
and prevailed in the federal district court on merits, which if presented to the
Supreme Court through the discretionary writ of certiorari, might not have
moved that Court to grant relief.
As the above cases indicate, an attempt to define the reach of Younger's
principles raises at least two issues: What types of state proceedings are pro-
2" Id. n.4 (emphasis added).
..2 Id. at 1215-16 (emphasis added).
2
'State v. Van Camp, 280 A.2d 536 (Conn. 1971).
.. A shorter alternative route possibly available would be a writ of habeas corpus
from a federal district court.
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tected? What relationship must the federal plaintiff bear to the state defendant?
Another issue is also emerging: Does Younger's standard of irreparable injury
apply even though at the time federal jurisdiction attaches no state proceeding
has as yet been commenced, but nevertheless a state proceeding is pending at
the time of the federal hearing? Of course, in all six of the Younger series of
cases there actually were state proceedings in progress before federal relief was
sought. But, as stated previously, the rationale of the sextet has a potential for
broader application. Also, in Askew v. Hargrave,' the abstention case pre-
viously discussed,' it was of paramount significance that a state proceeding was
subsequently filed challenging the same statute under attack in the pending
federal suit.
Although there apparently is no case as yet attempting to answer this precise
question (in Thorns the state prosecution was already pending when federal
jurisdiction was invoked), Judge Goldberg of the Fifth Circuit took note of
the issue in LeFlore v. Robinson.' He pointed out that Dombrowski merely
decided that subsequently filed state proceedings were not "pending" proceed-
ings under the anti-injunction statute."' Thus, Younger's standards could cer-
tainly apply in "subsequently filed" situations even though section 2283 does
not, since Younger was based upon separate and somewhat distinct considera-
tions of equity and federalism. "9'
C. Bad Faith, Harassment
Before the Younger sextet was decided some commentators thought that
they had discerned a diminished reliance by the Court upon the existence of
bad faith enforcement or harassment as a basis for justifying federal interven-
tion in Dombrowski-type cases.2" Indeed, many lower courts had been of the
opinion that one need only be "chilled" by the existence of a vague or over-
broad statute to qualify for federal injunctive relief."0' However, Younger and
its companion cases firmly reestablished the importance of bad faith or harass-
ment as evidence of "both great and immediate" irreparable injury. Although
the Court did not rule out the proof of extraordinary circumstances justifying
injunctive relief upon a showing of other facts,' 2 it is apparent that most suc-
cessful federal plaintiffs will be forced to build their cases upon bad faith or
harassment.
The two terms, though almost always used in tandem, do not seem to be
perfect synonyms."' "Harassment" connotes a more continuing interference
with civil rights over time than does "bad faith." Harassment usually takes the
295401 U.S. 476 (1971) (per curiam).
" See notes 60-70 supra, and accompanying text.
297446 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1971) (concurring opinion).
" Id. at 718 n.7.
2'Justice Brennan in his Perez concurring and dissenting opinion recognized, but
avoided, this issue: "I put to one side the question not presented in Ex parte Young, or in
this case, whether federal court relief would be proper when a state prosecution pending at
the time of federal hearing was begun after the federal suit was filed." 401 U.S. at 117 n.9.
"See, e.g., Maraist, supra note 7, at 585-87.
" See note 120 supra.
"'Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971); see notes 186-87 supra, and accom-
panying text.
'See Sandquist v. Pitchess, 332 F. Supp. 171, 175 n.5 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
[Vol. 26
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
form of repeated unlawful searches and seizures,"'4 multiple arrests or prose-
cutions,"' or other actual physical intrusions upon the person or property of
the victim of such "official lawlessness.""0 ' "Bad faith" enforcement as to the
specific proceeding may perhaps be shown upon milder facts. Since the Su-
preme Court in Samuels v. Mackell clearly made some finding of bad faith or
harassment (or other extraordinary circumstance) a prerequisite to a considera-
tion of the merits of a complaint seeking either declaratory or injunctive re-
lief,"80 the evidentiary facts become all-important. Thus, in the consolidated
cases of Movies, Inc. v. Conlisk and Weintraub v. Scot?"° the three-judge court
was compelled to find allegations of bad faith plus "some factual basis for
belief that bad faith existed" ' before declaring the challenged obscenity
statute constitutional. If the lower federal courts take this task of finding the
facts seriously, such a potentially time-consuming, threshold inquiry into po-
lice and prosecution practices may in itself have a "chilling effect" upon the
pending state prosecution. The Supreme Court has in theory sanctioned this
limited interference with the state proceeding, but this consideration may cause
some federal judges to deny evidentiary hearings on bad faith allegations unless
the complaint speaks with some particularity and seems to have merit."'
Generally, actions brought under section 1983 have not required proof of
a specific intent to deny constitutional rights on the part of the defendant.'
In contrast, when bad faith is alleged as an extraordinary circumstance justify-
ing federal intervention, it means a "deliberate willful perversion of the law
to gain an improper purpose," which must be directly shown and not merely
inferred."' The Supreme Court in Cameron v. Johnson"4 noted that a state
prosecution brought without a reasonable expectation of success would consti-
tute bad faith enforcement, but the Court added that this could only be found
when there is absolutely no evidence of the accused's guilt."' Therefore, all
legitimate motives must be absent; the sole motive for bringing the prosecution
must be to discourage the exercise of civil rights."' Thus, the federal plaintiff
has a great burden to overcome. However, once he has proved a prima facie
case of bad faith enforcement, the burden shifts to the state to come forward
with rebuttal testimony."
7
Despite the odds, several plaintiffs have successfully proved bad faith en-
forcement. On the basis of the following allegations bad faith either has been
3'4See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
'See, e.g., Sheridan v. Garrison, 273 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. La. 1967); Duncombe v.
New York, 267 F. Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Brock v. Schiro, 264 F. Supp. 330 (E.D.
La. 1967); Roberts v. Clement, 252 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
"'
6 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
"° Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 54, 56 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
808 401 U.S. at 73; see note 202 supra.
8"0Civil Nos. 70-c-2051, 70-c-1235 (N.D. Ill., July 7, 1971).
3 The court found such a factual basis by relying greatly upon the fact that the single
district judge had granted plaintiffs a temporary restraining order. Id.
"'See, e.g., Turco v. Allen, 334 F. Supp. 209 (D. Md. 1971); notes 336-41 in!ra.
"' Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F. Supp. 390 (E.D.
La. 1971).
313Hammond v. Brown, 450 F.2d 480, 481 (6th Cir. 1971).
3'4390 U.S. 611 (1968).
...Id. at 621-22.
"' Boyle v. Landry, 422 F.2d 631, 633 (7th Cir. 1970).
"
7 Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F. Supp. 390, 395 (E.D. La. 1971).
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found or the plaintiff merely failed to convince the court that his allegations,
though apparently sufficient, were true: a series of unlawful raids and entries
into the plaintiff's residence without arrest warrants or probable cause;"..
stopping cars on the highway without probable cause and in a discriminatory
fashion;"' enforcement of a statute long ago held unconstitutional by the Su-
preme Court; " a series of prior actions by state authorities indicating animosity
to the defendant;32' the prosecution or reprosecution of a defendant when it
serves no legitimate state interest;' and attempts of state prosecutors to use
their influence to prejudice appellate judges."'
Often subjective bad faith is divined from a view of the totality of the cir-
cumstances. Without revealing the specific bases for its findings, a three-judge
court in Taylor v. City of Selma.4 enjoined present and future prosecutions
under the Alabama antiriot statute, which was found to be vague and over-
broad. The court found that the statute had been used to harass and intimidate
the plaintiffs in an effort to prevent the plaintiffs from participating in a local
political campaign.2 "
The plaintiff in Duncan v. Perez"" had been the successful petitioner in the
landmark trial-by-jury case of Duncan v. Louisiana."' Duncan, a nineteen-year-
old Negro, had been convicted of battery, even though the facts indicated that
he had merely attempted to break up a fight between his relatives and four
white boys and that his "victim" displayed no bruises immediately after the
incident. After the Supreme Court's reversal Louisiana sought to retry Dun-
can."' The state apparently had tried to make the original prosecution as
burdensome as possible to Duncan. He was subjected to multiple arrests and
repeated resettings of unusually high preconviction bail; he received an un-
usually severe sentence; the state unlawfully demanded a double appeal bond;
the state trial judge and the prosecutor made unprofessional comments; and
Duncan's chief defense counsel was baselessly charged with the unlawful prac-
tice of law."' The court enjoined the state from reprosecuting Duncan, holding
that Louisiana had no legitimate interest in such a reprosecution " and that a
"'Wheeler v. Goodman, 238 F.2d 779 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (per curiam).
"'Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1971).
"'Wells v. Hand, 288 F. Supp. 779, 784 (M.D. Ga.), af]'d mem. sub nom. Wells v.
Reynolds, 382 U.S. 39 (1965).
"2 Cambist Films, Inc. v. Illinois, 292 F. Supp. 185, 190 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
"'Duncan v. Perez, 445 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971).
"'3Burak v. Sprague, 335 F. Supp. 347 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
'327 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ala. 1971) (per curiam).
"Id. at 1193.
"445 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971).
327 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Court held that the fourteenth amendment requires that
a defendant be given a right of trial by jury in any prosecution in a state court if he would
have such a right under the sixth amendment were he tried in a federal court.
121 Interestingly, after the Supreme Court's decision the Louisiana Legislature had re-
duced the maximum sentence for simple battery from two years to six months. Thus, Dun-
can would have been retried without a jury had the federal courts not intervened.
"'1d. at 559 n.3. His counsel sought and obtained injunctive relief on the basis of
showing of bad faith and harassment. Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. La. 1968).
" The district court below explained:
[Wlhether Duncan slapped or simply touched the white youth on the arm,
it is clear beyond dispute that any violation that may have occurred was so
slight and technical as to be generally reserved for law school hypotheticals
rather than criminal prosecutions. The white boy was not hurt and displayed
no bruise minutes after the incident. De minimus 'batteries' of this kind occur
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retrial would "cause irreparable injury to the exercise of federally secured
rights by Negro residents of Plaquemines Parish."33'
A similar holding grew out of the prosecution of Clay Shaw by New Orleans
District Attorney Jim Garrison for conspiracy to murder President John F.
Kennedy. After Shaw was acquitted on the conspiracy charge, Garrison indicted
him on perjury charges based on testimony given by Shaw in the conspiracy
trial. On the basis of a totality of the circumstances the court found that Garri-
son initiated the perjury prosecution with the specific intent to deny Shaw his
rights under the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments, and that sufficiently
extraordinary circumstances had been shown to enjoin the prosecution."' The
court traced the events leading up to and during the conspiracy trial, which
included: (1) an extremely zealous attempt by Garrison, given the tenuous
jurisdictional basis, to solve the murder of President Kennedy; (2) the ap-
parent knowing use of perjured testimony; and (3) the use of a group of New
Orleans businessmen known as "Truth or Consequences" as financial backers
of the investigation of Shaw."' The court then noted that no subsequently
acquitted accused who testified in his own behalf had ever been prosecuted
for perjury by Garrison, and that Garrison had possibly prosecuted Shaw for
perjury to promote Garrison's new book. 34
On the other side of the coin, courts have refused to find bad faith or harass-
ment when the totality of the circumstances convinced the court there was
subjective good faith and no irreparable injury. In Sandquist v. Pitchess" the
plaintiffs, two distributors and a proprietor of a theater dealing in "adult"
movies, were subjected to multiple arrests, and state officials seized several
films without a prior adversary hearing on the question of obscenity as required
by California law. Movie patrons were sometimes warned that they too might
be arrested, and on one occasion the plaintiffs claimed that state officers made
a general search of the premises similar to that in Dyson v. Stein, including
desks, drawers, and personal correspondence and files. The court said that no
useful definitions of bad faith or harassment had been formulated and that it
would, therefore, simply compare the facts in Sandquist with the facts of
Dombrowski to determine whether the "official lawlessness" in Sandquist, if
any, was sufficient to inflict irreparable injury. Thus, analytically the court did
not recognize bad faith or harassing enforcement as being of sufficient inde-
pendent significance to establish per se the extraordinary circumstances of
Younger. The court first held that the multiple arrests and prosecutions did
not establish irreparable injury in view of the fact that the plaintiffs distributed
and screened many different adult films several times daily. Although the lack
of prior judicial determinations of obscenity clearly made the seizures unlaw-
ful, this caused no great and immediate irreparable injury because expert police
officers and, sometimes, state's attorneys had previously viewed the seized films.
repeatedly in Plaquemines Parish and elsewhere and do not become the
subject of criminal proceedings.
321 F. Supp. 181, 184 (E.D. La. 1970).33
"
1 Id. at 185.
3 Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. La. 1971).
31 Id. at 393-99.
" id. at 399-400.
3'5332 F. Supp. 171 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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Nor did the bodily arrests, though tactless and probably unnecessarily harsh,
inflict sufficiently great irreparable harm under Younger. Even though the
court actually found the enforcement of the obscenity statute to have been in
good faith, the court's logic indicates that anything less severe than the bad
faith and harassment found in Dombrowski will not satisfy the Younger re-
quirement of great and immediate irreparable injury.
Another post-Younger case similarly indicates that sometimes Younger's
irreparable injury requirement may not be met, even though there are claims
of bad faith and harassment. In Turco v. Allen " the primary plaintiff, a Black
Panther attorney, was charged, inter alia, with conspiracy to murder. Between
mistrial and retrial he claimed that the charges against him had been brought
"in bad faith and without reasonable expectation of eventual success in order
to have a chilling effect on the exercise by him and his clients, including plain-
tiff Party, its chapters, affiliates and branches . . . of their fundamental rights
of expression .... .". The plaintiff alleged that the defendants knowingly
developed, procured, and later used perjured testimony in an effort to convict
the plaintiff. The Turco court refused to hold an evidentiary hearing to inquire
into whether there was in fact bad faith enforcement for two reasons: (1) be-
cause even if bad faith existed, the plaintiff could eliminate any threat to his
rights in his defense in the "single criminal prosecution"; and (2) because a
bad faith enforcement of a criminal law not in any way itself directed at first
amendment rights does not justify federal interference with a state prosecution.
The first prong of the court's reasoning is based on Justice Black's statement
in Younger that federal intervention is appropriate only when "the threat to
the plaintiff's federally protected rights [is] one that cannot be eliminated by
his defense against a single criminal prosecution."" Thus, the Turco court
chose these words out of context to say that even bad faith does not constitute
great and immediate irreparable injury. Of course, in Turco the second point
of the court's reasoning, plus the holding in Stefanelli v.. Minard" refusing to
enjoin use of illegal evidence, would possibly have been sufficient to decide the
case. However, the analyses in both Sandquist and Turco indicate that Younger's
general principles of restraint may be twisted to override the independent
grounds of bad faith or harassment.
Assuming Turco had been prosecuted under a statute regulating expres-
sion,' o if the statute were constitutional on its face, but was being used in bad
faith to harass the plaintiff in the exercise of first amendment rights, federal
injunctive relief would not properly extend to a wholesale striking down of
the statute. However, injunctive relief to prevent continued harassment or to
forbid application of the statute to the plaintiff at all would be in order."' Thus,
depending upon the circumstances and the statute involved, bad faith enforce-
330334 F. Supp. 209 (D. Md. 1971).337 Id. at 210.
38401 U.S. at 46.
'33342 U.S. 117 (1951).
' Compare Justice Brennan's concurring and dissenting opinion in Perez, 401 U.S. at
693 n.10, in which he argues that the first amendment should not be held to be the ex-
clusive constitutional provision protected by Dombrowski-type relief, with note 118 supra,
and accompanying text.
3"See Hull v. Petrillo, 439 F.2d 1184 (2d Cir. 1971).
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ment or harassment may be: (1) insufficient proof of extraordinary circum-
stances under Younger; (2) sufficient to establish extraordinary circumstances,
but justify relief only as to the particular plaintiff being harassed; or (3)
sufficient to establish extraordinary circumstances and justify a holding that
the statute in question is unconstitutional on its face.
D. Other Extraordinary Circumstances
At the close of the Younger opinion Justice Black added that there might
be other "extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury
can be shown."' He gave one example, that being a prosecution under a
statute that is "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohi-
bitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and
against whomever an effort might be made to apply it."' Finding such a
statute may prove to be as rare as capturing a "no-see-um." At any rate, the
"chilling effect" of such a statute would be the same type of inherent irre-
parable injury that some pre-Younger courts had ascribed to statutes that were
facially unconstitutional. Justice Black then added that "[o]ther unusual situ-
ations calling for federal intervention might also arise";... however, the Justice
did not give examples.
In three lower-court cases the plaintiffs sought to establish that the statute
under which they were being prosecuted was "flagrantly and patently unconsti-
tutional." In Sandquist v. Pitchess,' discussed above," the plaintiffs relied upon
the argument rejected by the Supreme Court in United States v. Reidel that
Stanley v. Georgia," in invalidating a state law punishing the possession of
"obscene material," had also prohibited the punishment of the sale or distribu-
tion of such materials. Therefore, the court had no trouble disposing of the
argument.
Manns v. Koontz4 gave the Fourth Circuit a slightly more difficult problem.
The plaintiff committed a crime against a juvenile, and under Virginia law the
plaintiff would have been tried without a jury in a domestic relations court.
However, state law did permit an appeal as of right with a trial by jury de
novo. The Supreme Court had long ago held an identical District of Columbia
procedure unconstitutional." However, because in Duncan v. Louisiana 1 the
Court was deemed to have reserved the question of whether the same procedure
would be unconstitutional if employed by a state, the Fourth Circuit held that
the Virginia law authorizing the procedure was not flagrantly and patently
unconstitutional.
The third case, Brown v. Ceci, 3 involved precisely the same type of "pos-
1401 U.S. at 53.
341Id. at 53-54, quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941).
44Id. at 54.
1332 F. Supp. 171 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
" See note 335 supra, and accompanying text.
341402 U.S. 351 (1971).
3"394 U.S. 557 (1969).
49451 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
"'Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
"1391 U.S. 145 (1968).
..., 331 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
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session of obscenity" statute struck down in Stanley v. Georgia,53 but in Brown
the plaintiff had already been convicted under the statute. The conviction was
effected when the judge denied a motion to dismiss by the prosecutor on the
basis of Stanley and entered the judgment on the verdict. The federal district
court held that no extraordinary circumstances under Younger were present.
The court did, however, feel compelled to treat the complaint as a petition for
habeas corpus, and gave the plaintiff sixty days to exhaust his state remedies.
Curiously, the court justified this treatment, among other reasons, "in light of
the patent invalidity of the state criminal statute in issue .... .,",
It is submitted that Brown could still be considered as authority for the
proposition that a Stanley-type statute is flagrantly and patently unconstitu-
tional under Younger. The Brown court simply was of the opinion that "[t]he
traditional remedy to challenge the validity of a state court conviction on the
ground of the unconstitutionality of the law on which conviction was founded
lies in petition for federal habeas corpus." '355 Since the habeas corpus remedy
has the built-in requirement that the petitioner exhaust state remedies,' the
court effectuated the spirit of Younger, if not the letter, and did not really
burden the plaintiff.
Several cases attempted to come within the "other unusual situations" cate-
gory. Of course, the courts refused to find extraordinary circumstances in the
face of allegations that the state courts will likely uphold the challenged
law,"5 or that obscenity prosecutions will cause a drop in box office receipts. "
In Scott v. Hill " a convicted murderer came up with an extremely imaginative
argument in support of an allegation of extraordinary circumstances. The plain-
tiff was appealing his conviction on due process grounds to the Kentucky
Court of Appeals. He alleged that he would be subjected to irreparable injury
if his appeal were to be heard by that court, since its judges were elected from
election districts not correctly apportioned under the Supreme Court's "one-
man-one-vote" rule. The Sixth Circuit observed that if the plaintiff failed in
the court of appeals, review could be had via certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court, and relief was denied.
In three instances the plaintiffs so moved the consciences of the chancellors
that the courts found their cases to fall within one of the "other unusual situ-
ations" justifying federal intervention in state prosecutions. Two cases involved
claims based upon violations of procedural due process, and the other dealt
with an overbroad injunction.
The plaintiff in Sweeton v. Sneddone' sought federal injunctive relief from
his prosecution on a misdemeanor charge without the assistance of counsel.
The plaintiff was on parole from two previous convictions, and a conviction
on the misdemeanor charge would likely cause the revocation of his parole
and his remand to prison for a possible seventeen years. Utah law required
8"394 U.S. 557 (1969).
3331 F. Supp. at 720 (emphasis added).
355 Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970).
sLivingston v. Garmire, 442 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1971) (semble).
3" Pederson v. Breier, 327 F. Supp. 1382 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
1-449 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1971).
...324 F. Supp. 1094 (D. Utah 1971).
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the appointment of counsel to indigents charged with crimes punishable by
more than six months in jail. Although the plaintiff was an indigent, the mis-
demeanor charge carried a penalty of under six months, and the state judge
refused to appoint counsel. The federal district court noted that the plaintiff's
request had already been denied in the "single criminal prosecution," and that
the plaintiff probably could not get counsel on appeal either. Even though the
constitutional right of the plaintiff to counsel in this situation was certainly
less than established by the precedents, the court held that he had such a right
and issued an injunction, since if "the prosecution of the misdemeanor action
against the petitioner without aid of counsel [is not] enjoined, the petitioner
will suffer great, irreparable, immediate injury."'' 1
In Pugh v. Rainwater"' the plaintiffs brought a class action challenging the
validity of a Florida arrest procedure that allowed arrest without a probable
cause hearing by a magistrate. Under the procedure the existence of probable
cause was determined by a state's attorney. In granting the plaintiffs' prayer
for injunctive relief the court presented two alternative lines of reasoning. First,
the court drew a distinction between an injunction directed against a state
substantive statute and one against a state procedural provision. Younger and
section 2283 are fully applicable to the first, since an injunction of the sub-
stantive statute halts state prosecutions, but not so applicable to the procedural
statute, since this is a much milder intrusion on state processes. " ' In the alterna-
tive the court argued that even if Younger applied, there was present the like-
lihood of great and immediate irreparable injury, which could not be eliminated
in a single criminal prosecution. According to the court, the irreparable injury
lay in imprisonment with no judicial determination of probable cause and the
fact that Florida courts had consistently denied the right asserted by the plain-
tiffs.
Both Sweeton and Pugh seem to be contrary to pre- 4 and post-Younger
361 Id. at 1104.
.62332 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
"'Id. at 1111. The argument that incidental injunctive relief may be granted if it does
not actually halt the state proceeding was thought to be discredited after Stefanelli v. Minard,
342 U.S. 117 (1951). Thus, the result in Scott v. Frey, 330 F. Supp. 365 (E.D. La. 1971),
see note 283 supra, and accompanying text, in which injunctive relief was denied the un-
prosecuted owner of allegedly obscene films seized by the police on the ground that an
order for the return of the films would inordinately interfere with the prosecution of the
projectionist, has been generally followed. However, in Rialto Theatre Co. v. City of Wil-
mington, 440 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1971), a lower-court order requiring the return of seized
films subject to a right of subpoena by the state upon trial (as opposed to an order pro-
hibiting their introduction into evidence) was not summarily reversed, but rather the case
was remanded with the admonition that the order "may have been an improper federal
interference with a state prosecution." Id. at 1327 (emphasis added). Then came the case
of G.I. Distribs., Inc. v. Murphy, 336 F. Supp. 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), in which a single-
judge district court ordered the return of allegedly obscene material seized under a warrant,
but without a prior adversary hearing, even though a state prosecution against the plaintiffs
was pending. This distinction between federal intervention that only indirectly interferes
with a state court proceeding could prove to be a viable theory by which to grant declaratory
relief to unprosecuted plaintiffs even though relief to their prosecuted co-plaintiffs would
be prohibited. See Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343 (3d Cit. 1971); notes 286-88 supra.
See also Golden Dawn Shops, Inc. v. Department of Housing & Urban Dev., 333 F. Supp.
874 (E.D. Pa. 1971). An order similar to the one in Murphy was upheld on appeal in
Mod Amusement Co. v. Murphy, 335 F. Supp. 1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also Star Dis-
tribs., Ltd. v. Hogan, 337 F. Supp. 1362 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
N4 See, e.g., James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cit. 1969); Gadsden v. Silberglitt,
299 F. Supp. 1236 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Richardson v. Dudley, 295 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.
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decisions,"s although the plights of the plaintiffs in these two cases particularly
called for preventive relief.' Certainly, certiorari to the Supreme Court would
not remedy the injury of the plaintiffs in Pugh, and the plaintiff in Sweeton
might not ever get that far without the assistance of counsel.
In Duke v. Texas" the plaintiffs had been permanently enjoined by a state
trial court from going on the campus of North Texas State University or dis-
rupting the normal educational and social activity of the university or urging
other persons to do so. The plaintiffs had also been enjoined from addressing
any student assembly without first complying with university regulations. The
state judge added: "[TIhe Court being of the opinion that whereas constitu-
tional questions could be raised on appeal and no emergency existed to neces-
sitate a ruling by the Court on any constitutional question, the Court made
no ruling relative thereto .... ""
The federal court first noted that both the state injunction and the pertinent
university regulations were violative of the first amendment. On the issue
whether comity barred injunctive relief, the court pointed out that the original
temporary restraining order against Duke and others had been issued ex parte
and not served on Duke until she was already on campus and hence in viola-
tion of the order. This latter circumstance prompted the court to deem in-
applicable the Supreme Court's decision in Walker v. Birmingham," which
held that federal plaintiffs may not bypass orderly state judicial review before
disobeying injunctions. Although the court purported to find great and im-
mediate irreparable injury, it stressed that the Younger line of cases set guide-
lines for intervention in state criminal prosecutions, not state civil proceedings.
The court found that the state trial judge's total abdication of his constitu-
tional duty to consider federal constitutional questions, critical to the vitality of
federalism, amounted to a denial of the right to a full and fair hearing. In
language coming close to pre-Younger interpretations of Dombrowski's "chil-
ling effect," the court found "a wholesale abridgement of [plaintiff's) rights
to freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association, which inherently con-
stitutes continuing irreparable injury."3'7
1969); Matzner v. Brown, 288 F. Supp. 608 (D.N.J. 1968); Johnson v. Lee, 281 F. Supp.
650 (D. Conn. 1968); Greene v. New York, 281 F. Supp. 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Hill
v. Nelson, 272 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Mayberry v. Weinrott, 255 F. Supp. 80(E.D. Pa. 1966); Alexander Bird in the Ground v. District Court, 239 F. Supp. 981 (D.
Mont. 1965).
W See, e.g., Rodriguez Rivera v. Maiz, 331 F. Supp. 713 (D.P.R. 1971); Corbett v.
Bowman, 327 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
" However, the constitutional right found in Sweeton was a new one, since the Supreme
Court has not yet extended the right to trial by jury in cases involving maximum penalties
of less than six months. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).867327 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Tex. 1971), noted in 50 TEXAs L. REV. 170 (1971).
'
6 Id. at 1223 n.1.
36388 U.S. 307 (1967).
570327 F. Supp. at 1234 (emphasis added). But the court purported to distinguish
Duke from Dombrowski: "In this case there is not merely a speculative 'chilling' threat,
* . but rather the cold reality of inestimable harm." id. There are omens that this new
"chilling effect" will become the most common "other extraordinary circumstance" justifying
intervention after Younger. See G.I. Distribs., Inc. v. Murphy, 336F. Supp. 1036, 1038-39
(S.D.N.Y. 1972): "Unlike a mere possibility of a 'chilling effect' on First Amendment
freedoms, here there was a complete and total restraint upon the operations of a magazine
distributor .... " See also Montgomery County Bd. of Educ. v. Shelton, 327 F. Supp. 811(N.D. Miss. 1971) (state court injunction found to have a present chilling effect; federal
injunction granted).
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The Duke court would not have hurdled past Walker v. Birmingham had it
not been for the ex parte character of the temporary restraining order. Pre-
sumably it is Walker that prevents more challenges to state injunctions from
coming into the lower federal courts. In Duke the injunction operated almost
as one would expect the "flagrantly and patently unconstitutional" statute of
Younger to operate. The state court injunction could well be a more severe
violation of a plaintiff's first amendment rights than a flagrantly overbroad
statute, since the injunction is directed against a specific person and its viola-
tions are punishable by the summary contempt power of the court. Although
the refusal of a state trial judge to rule on constitutional points at all is probably
no worse than a "failure to grasp ' or to rule "correctly" on constitutional
points, in the Duke context it was apparently sufficient to add "greatness and
immediacy" to otherwise irreparable injury.
E. Younger and Threatened Prosecutions
After Dombrowski was decided, the burning issue was whether that holding
allowed injunctions in cases where there were pending state prosecutions when
the federal suit was filed."'7 The Younger sextet in the main said such injunc-
tions are not available. Now the new question to be emphasized is whether the
principles of those six cases are applicable when state prosecutions are threat-
ened but not pending."' Several aspects of the various sextet opinions provide
inferences that Younger extends to such cases. First, all the prior cases relied
upon by the majority to establish the rule of nonintervention were threatened
prosecution cases." 4 Particularly limited was Dombrowski, the most far-reach-
ing of all the threatened-prosecution cases. Second, a primary basis for the
holdings of the Younger series, that as a matter of law the Dombrowski "chill"
can be eliminated by a defense to a single criminal prosecution, could easily
apply to cases in which the state prosecution, though not begun prior to the
attaching of federal jurisdiction, was nevertheless in being by the time of the
federal hearing."3 But despite this reasoning, both majority"'7 and concurring
opinions7 noted that the sextet's principles were not necessarily intended to
apply in circumstances other than those involving pending state criminal
prosecutions. Further restraint on Younger was generated by Justice Brennan's
dissent (joined by Justices White and Marshall) in Perez v. Ledesma."8'
"'See Gregory v. Gaffney, Civil No. 2657 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
3' See Maraist, supra note 7, at 591-603. See also Boyer, Federal Injunctive Relief: A
Counterpoise Against the Use of State Criminal Prosecutions Designed To Deter the Exer-
cise of Preferred Constitutional Rights, 13 How. L.J. 51 (1967); Note, The Dombrowski
Remedy-Federal Injunctions Against State Proceedings Violative of Constitutional Rights,
21 RUTGERS L. REv. 92, 124-29 (1966).
"'Leflore v. Robinson, 446 F.2d 715, 716-19 (5th Cir. 1971) (Goldberg, J., con-
curring).
3 4 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319
U.S. 157 (1943); Williams v. Miller, 317 U.S. 599 (1942) (per curiam); Watson v.
Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941); Spielman
Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
3'5Of course, this situation would be avoided when the federal complaint has some
merit and a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction issue to prevent
the commencement of state proceedings.
376 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73-74
(1971).
7 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 55 (Stewart, J., concurring).
.171401 U.S. 82, 93 (1971).
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In Perez the majority held that it had no jurisdiction over the question of
the St. Bernard Parish ordinance. Justice Brennan, finding jurisdiction to review
the lower court's holding that the ordinance was unconstitutional, reached the
question whether Younger's principles barred equitable relief from the threat-
ened enforcement of an unconstitutional ordinance. The Justice emphasized
that the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act were to obviate the necessity
of violating a state statute to determine its constitutionality and to provide a
form of relief milder than an injunction for use when the statute is deemed
unconstitutional.
Justice Brennan noted that Douglas v. City of Jeannette.. normally required
a defendant in a state criminal prosecution to test his constitutional defenses
initially in state rather than federal courts. However, Dombrowski taught that
in at least two extraordinary situations federal intervention might be justified
because the state courts were unable or unwilling adequately to protect the
defendant's constitutional rights. The first situation, in which bad-faith en-
forcement or harassment is involved, clearly justifies federal intervention to
save the defendant from a burden he should not have to bear. The second
situation is found when a state criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad. In this instance the "chilling" or deterrent effect on first amendment
rights of merely having the statute on the books justifies federal intervention.
However, these principles were based upon the premise that the federal inter-
vention was an interference only with a threatened state prosecution. Justice
Brennan then reasoned that the considerations of federalism that come into
play when federal relief is sought after the beginning of a state prosecution
plainly outweigh the interests served by federal intervention.
When no state prosecution is pending, Justice Brennan would, therefore,
hold that in otherwise appropriate circumstances federal intervention may be
justified in three instances: ( 1) when there is bad faith enforcement or harass-
ment; (2) when a vague or overbroad statute is challenged as being violative
of the first amendment; or (3) when a statute is attacked as being violative of
any provision of the Constitution. The Justice thus underscored the duty of
federal courts to give declaratory relief even when injunctive relief would be
inappropriate.38 Citing Zwickler v. Koota,"8 ' Justice Brennan stated that declar-
atory relief would ordinarily be appropriate "if the declaration will serve a
useful purpose in resolving the dispute."38 The propriety of an injunction
should be determined "in the light of the traditional requirements of equity
jurisprudence as applied to the protection of constitutional rights."8 '
Thus, the lower federal courts have at least three options in threatened-
prosecution situations: (1) to apply Younger's standard, which requires bad
faith, harassment, or other extraordinary circumstances; (2) to apply Justice
Brennan's approach"4 of favoring declaratory relief even if an injunction is not
819319 U.S. 157 (1943).
380 "[I) n my view the federal court's duty to render a declaratory judgment is not the
less whatever may be its res judicata effect as between the parties to the litigation." 401
U.S. at 125 n.16. See notes 403-07 infra.
381389 U.S. 241 (1967).
"82401 U.S. at 121-22.
31d. at 122.
8 4 Justice Brennan's view may really be closer to option number three, but his lengthy
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proper; or (3) to ignore Younger altogether. As might be expected, all three
of these options appear to have been employed.
Two district courts have chosen to ignore Younger altogether in threatened-
prosecution contexts, thus rewarding plaintiffs who are ingenious enough to
time their lawsuits so that standing requirements are satisfied without falling
into the pending-prosecution category." The court in Mitchell Family Plan-
ning, Inc. v. City of Royal Oak, 8 without much discussion, enjoined a threat-
ened prosecution under an ordinance prohibiting the advertising of abortion
information upon the showing that the ordinance was unconstitutional. In
Maldonado v. County of Monterey.. the plaintiffs were granted a preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of a county ordinance prohibiting amplifi-
cation of the human voice on all public highways. In so doing, the court noted
that if Younger were to apply to threatened-prosecution situations, plaintiffs
would be forced to exhaust state judicial remedies before proceeding in federal
court under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The court was unwilling to "make
such an unprecedented extension of the Younger decision.""
The First Circuit, a three-judge district court, and a single-judge district
court have held that Younger's principles do not apply with equal force to
threatened-prosecution situations, and have entered declaratory judgments. The
two district courts, in Anderson v. Vaugh" and Thorns v. Smith," simply
pointed out that the sextet opinions were expressly silent about circumstances
that might justify federal intervention when no state prosecutions are pending.
Declaratory rather than injunctive relief was granted because there was "no
reason to believe that the Connecticut authorities will now continue . . . en-
forcement. '
Of the three courts so holding, the First Circuit has written the most thought-
ful opinion in Wulp v. Corcoran."' The court distinguished pending- from
threatened-prosecution situations on three counts. First, when a federal court
interferes with a pending prosecution, three consequences are likely-duplica-
tion of effort, lost time, and "the clear expression of a lack of confidence by
federal courts in the capacity or the willingness of state courts to vindicate
federal constitutional rights." ' These results are not as likely when a federal
court hears constitutional claims prior to the initiation of a state court proceed-
ing. Secondly: "When no prosecution is pending, there is no guarantee that
prosecution and a chance for ultimate vindication of constitutional claims will
quickly follow on the heels of a violation of the state statute." ' Thirdly, this
discussion of the merits of declaratory relief indicates that the Justice sees Younger's im-
pact on threatened-prosecution situations as dictating the very sparing use of injunctive relief.
"'3 See note 248 supra, and accompanying text.
...335 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
3.330 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
8 8 1d. at 1284. See also Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1971):
"To apply [Younger] outside its intended sphere-the well-established doctrine of comity
restraints against federal interference with pending state criminal proceedings-would be
in direct contradiction to the purposes of the Civil Rights Act ....
388327 F. Supp. 101 (D. Conn. 1971).
334 F. Supp. 1203 (D. Conn. 1971).
391 327 F. Supp. at 104; 334 F. Supp. at 1211.
.. 454 F.2d 826 (1st Cir. 1972).




danger of a delayed prosecution is compounded when the statute involved is
facially unconstitutional. But the question remained: "[Dloes the same rigorous
standard of 'great and immediate' harm as defined in Younger apply to a case
when no prosecution is pending but there is every reasonable expectation that
a violation would be criminally prosecuted?""'  The court answered that
Younger's requirements of bad faith, harassment, or other injury besides that
incidental to every criminal prosecution are not necessary; and that a chilling
effect from a vague or overbroad law regulating expression or the "minor im-
pact on speech incidental to a law regulating conduct" would justify relief
under the Declaratory Judgment Act.' The court said that any other answer
would be the equivalent of repealing of that Act.9' Further, following Justice
Brennan's Perez dissent, the court granted only declaratory relief, "[s~ince there
is no evidence before us that would indicate that defendants will not accept in
good faith this final determination of the ordinance's unconstitutionality.""'
In Becker v. Thompson'" a panel of the Fifth Circuit chose option number
one and applied Younger's stringent standard in a case involving a threatened
prosecution. Judge Tuttle, who concurred in the result, argued that such a de-
cision was not necessary to dispose of the case." The court held that Younger's
limitation upon the use of the Declaratory Judgment Act in pending prose-
cution situations "necessarily applies in preprosecution cases."4 ' The court
reasoned that the message of Samuels, that the propriety of declaratory and
injunctive relief should be judged by essentially the same standards, dictates
that courts require bad faith, harassment, or other extraordinary circumstances
for the granting of declaratory as well as injunctive relief.
Thus, although deeper considerations of federalism obviously supported the
decisions in Wulp and Becker, each court simply chose to draw different con-
clusions from the fact that the sextet opinions did not speak to threatened-
prosecution situations. The Wulp court saw this reservation as an implicit
recognition that threatened-prosecution cases might require different treatment.
Having so reasoned, the discussions of the differences between injunctive and
declaratory relief found in Justice Brennan's concurring and dissenting opinion
in Perez and the majority opinion in Zwickler v. Koota seemed clearly ap-
plicable. On the other hand, the Becker court noted that the sextet opinions
relied upon threatened-prosecution cases as precedent for the strict extraordi-
nary circumstances standard, and that the Supreme Court in Samuels did not
"I Id. at 832.
96 Id.
3" Id. Compare this language with that of Justice Brennan: "Congress expressly rejected
that limitation and to engraft it upon the availability of the congressionally provided decla-
ratory remedy is simply judicial defiance of the congressional mandate. It is nothing short
of judicial repeal of the statute. If the statute is to be repealed or rewritten, it must be
done by Congress, not this Court." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 116 (1971) (concurring
and dissenting opinion).
399454 F.2d at 835.
" Civil No. 71-1856 (5th Cir., May 3, 1972).
40 "Both Dombrowski and Zwickler require that we do not intervene in the case at
bar. We are not dealing with a statute that is facially defective in any way. Moreover, there
is nothing in this record that would support a finding that this threatened application of an
otherwise valid statute was 'for the purpose of discouraging protected activities.' " Id. at 12
(Tuttle, J., concurring).
'" Id. at 9. See also Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Nelson, 327 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Ariz.
1971).
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distinguish the threatened prosecution situation in Zwickler. All this indicated
to the Becker panel that the Supreme Court would not differentiate between
threatened- and pending-prosecution cases.
The Wulp approach is attractive in many practical ways. For example, if
the heart of the problem is that state judges and prosecutors are reluctant to
protect federal constitutional rights because they must stand for election,
federal declaratory relief could give them a good opportunity to get off the
hook with the excuse: "The federal judge made me do it." From the same
perspective, if the ultimate basis of law is its moral, rather than coercive force,
the federal declaratory judgment could serve as the leader in pulling local
public opinion ahead rather than pushing it from the behind.
However, this approach has its problems. As Justice Stewart said in Gunn
v, University Committee To End the War in Viet Nam:
[W]hen a three-judge district court issues an opinion expressing the view that
a state statute should be enjoined as unconstitutional--and then fails to follow
up with an injunction-the result is unfortunate at best. For when confronted
with such an opinion by a federal court, state officials would no doubt hesitate
long before disregarding it. Yet in the absence of an injunctive order, they
are unable to know precisely what the three-judge court intended to enjoin,
and unable as well to appeal to this Court."'
Justice Brennan himself admitted that the res judicata effect of a declaratory
judgment is a point "not free from difficulty and the governing rules remain to
be developed with a view to the proper workings of a federal system."4 ' Indeed,
the law appears to be that state courts are not bound by the constitutional
holdings of lower federal courts."" Thus, in the absence of a different "govern-
ing rule" from the Supreme Court, the duty of federal courts to render de-
claratory judgments may be nothing more than a duty to render advisory
opinions, entitled to varying degrees of weight depending upon the particular
state, prosecutor, and judge involved."'
402399 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1970).
403401 U.S. at 125.
4
°
4 See United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971), noted in 25 Sw. L.J. 478 (1971); Owsley v. Peyton, 352
F.2d 804 (4th Cir. 1965); Rohr Aircraft Corp. v. County of San Diego, 51 Cal. 2d 759,
336 P.2d 521 (1959), rev'd on other grounds, 362 U.S. 628 (1960); Brown v. State, 466
S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971); Kemp v. State, 464 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Crim. App.
1971); Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). Contra, Commonwealth
v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213 A.2d 670 (1965); Ellis v. State, 386 P.2d 326 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1963). See also Demich, Inc. v. Ferdon, 426 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated mem.,
401 U.S. 990 (1971); Monica Theater v. Municipal Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 1, 88 Cal. Rptr.
71 (1970). The rationale is that the lower federal courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction
over state courts; state courts answer only to the Supreme Court.
The Senate report on the Declaratory Judgment Act stated that "[t]he declaratory judg-
ment is a final, binding judgment between adversary parties and conclusively determines
their rights." S. REP. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934) (emphasis added).
405On the plus side, Justice Brennan hailed the flexibility of the declaratory judgment:
A state statute may be declared unconstitutional in toto-that is, incapable
of having constitutional applications; or it may be declared unconstitutionally
vague or overbroad-that is, incapable of being constitutionally applied to
the full extent of its purport. In either case, a federal declaration of uncon-
stitutionality reflects the opinion of the federal court that the statute cannot
be fully enforced. If a declaration of total unconstitutionality is affirmed by
this Court, it follows that this Court stands ready to reverse any conviction
under the statute. If a declaration of partial unconstitutionality is affirmed
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Further, Justice Brennan does not provide guidance for federal courts that
have rendered declaratory judgments which have been ignored by the party-
prosecutor. An injunction may be the answer, since apparently section 2283
does not prohibit an injunction against a subsequently initiated state prosecu-
tion to protect and effectuate the existing declaratory judgment. " Thus, even
though there is no "great and immediate" irreparable injury present at the
time of judgment, a violation of that judgment could justify the issuance of an
injunction, although, apparently, it could not justify contempt proceedings."'
The situation is less easily resolved when the prosecutor ignoring the judg-
ment is a nonparty engaged in a prosecution of a nonparty defendant.0" Be-
cause the prosecution has already commenced, any equitable relief must be
predicated upon a finding of bad faith, harassment, or other extraordinary
circumstances. Normally these will not be present in the usual sense, and it
would, therefore, appear that the federal court has no choice but to dismiss.
However, there is one possible alternative. Even though the previously rendered
declaratory judgment is not res judicata as to these nonparties, the prosecutor
could be deemed to be in bad faith for prosecuting under a state statute, the
constitutionality of which is, at least, in some doubt. However, this result would
turn the heretofore "persuasive" declaratory judgment into as "coercive" a
measure as an injunction,"9 and Justice Brennan's arguments in favor of the
device because it is a milder intrusion upon the affairs of the states are some-
what undercut.
The approach of the Becker panel is the one more likely to be in line with
the emerging majority on the Burger Court; it would eliminate the race to
the courthouses by refusing to distinguish between the effect of federal inter-
vention in threatened- and pending-prosecution cases. Conceptually, the cases
on federal injunctive relief, as supplemented by Becker, yield the following
analysis:
(1) When the state action challenged involves no state civil or criminal
proceeding (or only a threatened civil proceeding), injunctive relief will be
proper when the traditional principles of equity, inadequate remedy at law and
irreparable injury, are present. In this situation if the state action violates a
constitutional right, the equitable prerequisites are probably necessarily satis-
fied. 10
by this Court, the implication is that this Court will overturn particular ap-
plications of the statute, but that if the statute is narrowly construed by the
state courts it will not be incapable of constitutional applications. Accord-
ingly, the declaration does not necessarily bar prosecutions under the statute,
as a broad injunction would.
401 U.S. at 124-25.
400Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965).
407 "Though (a declaratory judgment] may be persuasive, it is not ultimately coercive;
noncompliance with it may be inappropriate, but is not contempt." Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U.S. 82, 126 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
408 See note 404 supra, and accompanying text.
40 This approach would also be tantamount to a holding that state courts and prose-
cutors are bound by the constitutional holdings of lower federal courts.
40See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (state conditioning employment
upon the taking of a loyalty oath). In a Younger footnote Justice Black explained the
ease with which the Court decided Baggett:
Apart from the fact that any plaintiff discharged for exercising his constitu-
tional right to refuse to take the oath would have had no adequate remedy at
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(2) When the state action challenged involves a pending state civil pro-
ceeding, the prohibition of the anti-injunction statute may dictate a denial of
injunctive relief;411 but if the statute can be avoided, relief will be proper on
the satisfaction of the standard in paragraph (1) above.41 '
(3) When the state action challenged involves a threatened or pending state
criminal proceeding, relief can be granted only if bad faith, harassment, or
other extraordinary circumstances are present, and if the anti-injunction statute
can be avoided.
In Wulp the First Circuit would set up a separate standard for threatened-
prosecution cases. In those cases relief (declaratory at least) would be proper
upon a showing of inadequate remedy at law and irreparable injury, as limited
by the traditional reluctance of equity to interfere with the administration of
a state's criminal laws. For instance, in a threatened-prosecution case pre-
Younger case law would apparently control, thus making relief appropriate if
a plaintiff's rights are "chilled" by an overbroad law regulating expression.
IV. THE POST-YOUNGER STATUS OF THE ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTE
Two months after the Younger sextet opinions were handed down, the Su-
preme Court noted probable jurisdiction in Mitchum v. Foster."" One question
argued and briefed in Mitchum was whether section 1983 is an express ex-
ception to section 2283."'4 It, therefore, seems likely that the Court will com-
plement the Younger series with a long-awaited determination of the applica-
bility of the anti-injunction statute when federal jurisdiction is based upon the
Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Mitchum is strikingly similar to Marseo v. Cannon,"' which held that a
pending state proceeding to abate a nuisance, being a quasi-criminal proceed-
ing, called for the application of Younger's principles, and that on the facts
no extraordinary circumstances were present to justify injunctive relief. In
Mitchum the federal plaintiff owned a bookstore, and the defendants secured
law, the relief sought was of course the kind that raises no special problem-
an injunction against allegedly unconstitutional state action (discharging
the employees) that is not part of a criminal prosecution.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 47 n.4 (1971). See also Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d
456, 466 (5th Cir. 1971):
In the instant case, we are not even faced with the force and applicability
of the anti-injunction act. The present challenge to the Macon ordinance and
charter provisions not only is outside the criminal sphere but also poses no
possibility of interference with pending state proceedings. Rather, the present
challenge simply requests relief against allegedly unconstitutional state action
in the form of conditioning employment upon the surrender of political
activity.
411At least one court in a civil case has relied upon Samuels (implicitly rejecting the
emphasis of Zwickler) in holding that if an injunction would violate the anti-injunction
statute, a declaratory judgment is also barred. Golden Dawn Shops, Inc. v. Department of
Housing & Urban Dev., 333 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
412See, e.g., Duke v. Texas, 327 F. Supp. 1218, 1233-34 (E.D. Tex. 1971). But see
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 92 S. Ct. 1113, 1124 (1972) (White, J., dissenting).
413315 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Fla. 1970), probable jurisdiction noted, 402 U.S. 941
(1971). The case was argued Dec. 13, 1971. 40 U.S.L.W. 3300 (1971).
4
14 See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 92 S. Ct. 1113, 1126 n.2 (1972) (White, J.,
dissenting).




state interlocutory relief under statutes providing for the abatement of nuisances
after the state court determined that the plaintiff had offered for sale certain
books found to be obscene. The plaintiff appealed and then sought and obtained
temporary restraining orders from federal court enjoining further proceedings
in state court. However, on the basis of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Engineers"' the three-judge court dissolved the temporary
restraining orders and denied permanent injunctive relief.
One approach that the Supreme Court might take in deciding Mitchum
was indicated in a decision of the Court rendered in March 1972, Lynch v.
Household Finance Corp.41 ' In Lynch the Court held that a pre-suit garnish-
ment, even though made for the purpose of making a future judgment effect-
ive,418 was not a state court proceeding under section 2283. Although the Court
relied heavily on quirks of Connecticut procedure, there are omens in the
opinion that point to restricting the prohibition of section 2283 by constricting
the definition of "proceeding." The Court took note of Connecticut's pre-suit
garnishment procedure, which allows the attorney of a plaintiff-creditor to
attach a debtor's property unilaterally and without court order or supervision,
and the fact that Connecticut courts have held that they have no authority to
enjoin such a garnishment on constitutional grounds. The Court added: "One
assumption underlying § 2283 is that state courts will vindicate constitutional
claims as fairly and efficiently as federal courts. But this assumption cannot
obtain when the doors of the state courts are effectively closed to a person
seeking to enjoin a garnishment on constitutional grounds." 1"
Although Justices White, Burger, and Blackmun dissented vigorously,""0
the Lynch decision will have important effect if it is extended. In Lynch there
was a full-fledged state court proceeding in being before the filing of the
federal complaint; that is, the garnishment process had been completed and
the suit on the debt was in progress. More significantly, the Court's rationale-
that the anti-injunction statute applies only when state courts will vindicate
constitutional claims as fairly and efficiently as federal courts-is potentially
very broad. This judicial gloss on the apparently rigid terms of the anti-injunc-
tion statute may set the stage for holding in Mitchum that section 1983 is an
exception to section 2283. Such a holding at first blush seems unpredictable
from the Burger Court. However, a majority clearly supports the proposition
that the anti-injunction statute does not bar injunctive relief when the pending
state proceeding is totally inadequate for the protection of the plaintiff's federal
constitutional rights. This reasoning would fit nicely into the Younger frame-
work, whose dictum allows injunctive relief against pending state proceedings
in extraordinary circumstances--i.e., when the pending proceeding is unable
to protect the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Indeed, the Court might hold that
whenever Younger's extraordinary circumstances are found, section 2283 is
no bar to declaratory or injunctive relief under the theory that the state court
is necessarily unable fairly and efficiently to protect federal constitutional rights.
410 398 U.S. 281 (1970); see notes 124-26 supra, and accompanying text.
41192 S. Ct. 1113 (1972).
41 See Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393 (1935). See also note 143 supra.41992 S. Ct. at 1124 (emphasis added).
420 id.
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If this route is chosen, a decision that section 1983 is an express exception to
section 2283 might be unnecessary. In any event, the Court is likely to find
some method of avoiding the absolute prohibition of the anti-injunction statute.
The unqualified refusal to do so would not only be unwise, but, given the broad
scope of section 2283, such a decision would make no sense in light of the
amount of judicial energy expended on the Younger sextet opinions, which
emphasized the role of comity restraints on the exercise of federal equity juris-
diction in pending-prosecution cases.*
V. PROCEDURAL IMPACT
Attempts to reconcile the case law from Ex parte Young through Younger
will yield elaborate formulae as to what the law is. At minimum, the Younger
sextet reveals a goal to restrict the substantive grounds upon which a plaintiff
may obtain federal equitable relief against state court proceedings. One result
of this substantive restriction will be a ripple effect, bringing a contraction of
the plaintiff's procedural rights to an adequate factual hearing in the federal
court, a corresponding expansion in protection to the defendants, and as to the
federal court system, a boost in cost-efficiency by eliminating the case earlier
with less expenditure of judicial resources.
To illustrate: A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief generally will be under
some time pressure, especially if he is engaged in a race to the courthouses
encouraged by section 2283. Since he will be faced with varying interpretations
of the Younger sextet, the pleader will tend to shotgun past the barriers. First,
to avoid the $10,000 limitation in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, he will plead his com-
plaint into one or several of the substantive civil rights sections under title
42, and place jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (4), which has no $ 10,-
000 limitation."' Pleading these sections will also lay the basis for claiming a
statutory exception to section 2283.' Second, in order to avoid defenses based
upon standing, he may attempt to join as plaintiffs a variety of people with
varying shades of interest and impact." Third, in choosing defendants, if the
pleader wants to lodge the case in a three-judge court,' he will select a state
* Editor's Note: After this Article was in print, the Supreme Court unanimously de-
cided in Mitchum v. Foster, 40 U.S.L.W. 4737 (U.S. June 19, 1972), that S 1983 is an
express exception to § 2283.
4 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970) provides: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: . . .
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress
providing for the protection of civil rights .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
"Every person . .. shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress." (Emphasis added.)
However, S 1343 and the civil rights sections contain a number of technical limitations
not present under § 1331; e.g., who is a "person"? Bennett v. People of State of Cal.,
406 F.2d 36 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 966 (1969) (California Adult Au-
thority and Department of Corrections are not "persons"); see Lynch v. Household Fin.
Corp., 92 S. Ct. 1113 (1972) (rejecting argument that § 1983 excludes cases involving
property rights).
4" See notes 166-68, 413-20 supra, and accompanying text.
'Strategically, however, the plaintiff faces the dilemma of all shotgun pleaders: By
making too complex a case out of it, he may lose focus and credibility, or allow the court
to abstain on the ground that there are many questions of unsettled state law. He also faces
the choice of narrowing his parties to exclude privity with state court defendants. See text
accompanying notes 180, 181 supra.
"Although one reason for creating the three-judge court was to protect state officers
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official operating under a statute of statewide application and allege the un-
constitutionality of the statute.425 Fourth, he will state a claim for relief in terms
of the case law and the civil rights statutes: (a) deprivation of a constitutional
right through statutes or ordinances unconstitutional on their face, or as they
are being applied to the plaintiff, or upon official practices independent
of statutes and ordinances; (b) the special circumstances of harassment,
bad faith, or other activities of the defendants; (c) irreparable injury to
the plaintiffs and inadequate remedy in the state courts; (d) the demand for
relief, whether injunctive or declaratory, or some variation of these.
Assuming the plaintiff can hurriedly4 put together a complaint that states
a claim for relief, and a motion for a temporary restraining order, a bond,
a certificate of the attorney, an affidavit of the facts under rule 65," he can
file and serve. The federal court, either in an ex parte proceeding, but more
often in a conference with the defendant's lawyer present, will then be faced
with applying the substantive law to the plaintiff's request for the temporary
restraining order. Here, the plaintiff ought to be aided by the traditional in-
terpretation of rule 8(a).. that his complaint should be construed in a light
most favorable to the pleader and should not be dismissed unless it appears
to a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of the facts
which could be proved in support of the claim. 2' Again, the plaintiff should also
be aided by the factor that the temporary restraining order issued without
notice may extend for a maximum of twenty days, ° that its only purpose is to
hold the status quo, and the reasonableness of its issuance is to be measured by
comparing the harm to the plaintiff if preliminary relief is wrongfully denied
and the harm to the defendant if it is wrongfully granted."'
At this point the new Younger sextet will have observable impact. Despite
the liberal policy of rule 8(a), the court may now require the pleader to
specify in some detail the facts that constitute the bad faith or harassment by
the defendants, and the irreparable injury to the plaintiff in order to overcome
the assertion that his complaint is conclusionary and does not state a claim
for relief." Similarly, the subtle task of weighing relative hardships to plain-
from "injunction-happy" district judges, one modern irony is that it now allows disfavored
civil rights plaintiffs to dilute the possible hostility of a single district judge, and to obtain
direct review in the Supreme Court.
528 U.S.C. S 2281 (1970).
The plaintiff will normally be in a hurry unless he has had the luxury of studying
the problem over a period of time.
4
7 FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
" Id. 8(a).
"uConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d 165 (7th Cit.
1963), rev'd, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
430 FED. R. CIV. P. 65 (a). The defendant may consent to further extension. The rule is
not clear how long a TRO granted with notice may extend, but presumably notice converts
the hearing into one for a preliminary injunction.
4' Z. CHAFEE & E. RE, supra note 81, at 818-23; Developments in the Law-Injunc-
tions, 73 HARV. L. REv. 994, 1056 (1965).
"' Some judges may interpret the Younger sextet, especially Boyle v. Landry and Dyson
v. Stein, in such a way that no amount of facts constituting harassment or bad faith can
ever satisfy the test, and that consequently the ability to raise defenses in the state court is
"an adequate remedy" as a matter of law. See Turco v. Allen, 334 F. Supp. 209 (D. Md.
1971); Alga, Inc. v. Crosland, 327 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Ala. 1971); notes 335-41 supra,
and accompanying text.
A parallel is found in the difficulty of pleading facts that will constitute sufficient "ma-
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tiff and defendant during the status quo period against the probability of
success, measured under the new Younger standards, results in deflation of
plaintiff's injury, inflation of defendant's harm, and reduction in the probability
of the plaintiff's victory.' Assuming the judge either grants or denies the
temporary restraining order and does not dismiss the case, neither decision is
appealable.4 '
The next sequence is variable, depending upon what motions are made by
the plaintiff, what motions are made by the defendants, and the order in which
the judge chooses to manage and set these motions down for hearing, if at
all .' The plaintiff will move for a preliminary injunction under rule 65, and,
more significantly, move for acceleration of various discovery orders with per-
mission of the court.' The defendants meanwhile will submit motions to dis-
miss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for re-
lief, and perhaps for summary judgment. The grounds of the dismissal motions
and supporting briefs will assert the constitutionality of the statutes, and the
absence of grounds for equitable relief, and will also raise section 2283, absten-
tion, and exhaustion of state remedies issues." Under rule 12 (a) the defendants
have twenty days to answer, and the filing of a motion to dismiss suspends the
time for answering until ten days after the court rules on the motion.' Thus,
in theory the defendants' burden at this stage is light, since the defendant is not
required to admit or deny the allegations of the complaint, or raise affirmative
defenses."' However, if the court immediately holds a hearing on the motion
liciousness" to overcome the tort immunity of federal government employees, after the
substantive rule was laid down in Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). Indeed, one of the
explicit policy reasons previously articulated by Judge Learned Hand for granting a wide
immunity to government employees is to protect them from having to spend inordinate
amounts of time defending themselves in court. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.
1949). That is, on the basis of the immunity, complaints can presumably be knocked out
with motions to dismiss, rather than after time-consuming factual inquiry. Josephson v.
Joslin, 38 F.R.D. 344 (D.N.J. 1965).
"' It is in this balancing process that the full thrust of the swinging pendulum will be
felt. See text accompanying note 246 supra.4
-"But see United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961) (drawing an excep-
tion to the general rule of nonappealability).
"'It is possible that the federal judge might simply refuse to hold a hearing or delay
it for so long that plaintiff would have to resort to mandamus.
4" Under FED. R. CIV. P. 30 an oral deposition may be taken only with leave of the
court if the plaintiff seeks to take it prior to the expiration of 30 days after service of the
summons and complaint. Under rules 33, 34, and 36, the defendant has 45 days to respond
to interrogatories and requests for documents or admissions, if they were served with the
summons and complaint, but the court may allow a shorter or longer time.
"'At issue here is which defenses may the defendants raise under a rule 12(b) (1)
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and a 12(b) (6) motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or, as phrased in this
context, "failure to state a claim for federal intervention." Star Satellite, Inc. v. Rosetti,
441 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). See also Peoples v. City of Birmingham, 440
F.2d 1352 (5th Cir. 1971); Gornto v. Thomas, 439 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam). Are the defenses of § 2283, abstention, exhaustion of state remedies, lack of
irreparable injury, and adequate state remedy, available on these motions? By analogy to
other areas, the answer seems to be that if these defenses appear on the face of the com-
plaint, they can be raised by such a motion, but if these defenses depend upon factual
assertions, they cannot. However, since these motions can be treated as motions for summary
judgment under rule 56, if material outside the pleadings is considered, the issue is sup-
posed to be a quibbling one. See 2A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 12.09 (2d ed. 1968).
See also Hull v. Petrillo, 439 F.2d 1184 (2d Cir. 1971) (whenever a court considers
affidavits outside the pleadings, a summary judgment is the proper characterization).
438 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a).
4 Professor Moore recognizes that a motion by the defendant for summary judgment
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for preliminary injunction, these procedural rules undergo some bending and
the defendants may be forced to accelerate their defense.40 Since the court may
later use any evidence taken at the preliminary injunction hearing for the trial
on the merits, or may by order accelerate the trial of the action on the merits
into the hearing of the temporary injunction, that hearing may constitute the
real and only trial of the issues."' Yet the hearing may come at a time when
the defendant has not answered the complaint and when motions to dismiss
and for discovery are still pending. Because the hearing is an equitable proceed-
ing, the judge has great discretion in determining the method of proceeding
and taking evidence."' For example, by refusing to order acceleration, the trial
judge may avoid an oral hearing in spite of rule 43 (a).' That rule provides
that in all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court.
However, rule 43(e) provides that a motion (and presumably a motion for
preliminary injunction is a motion) may be heard on affidavits, or wholly or
partly on oral testimony or depositions.' Under this authority one harassed
judge, in an unreported maneuver,' took a creative route. He stopped an oral
hearing on the ground that his docket was full, ordered discovery to be taken
by both sides in ten days, and ordered the parties to submit proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law referenced to the depositions, along with briefs.
He then made the decision without further argument or presentation by
counsel.'
A central issue emerges that is not expressly answered in the rules or in
precedent: To what extent does the plaintiff have a right to discovery prior
to the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction or to subpoena witnes-
ses to the hearing? The defendant may have pending motions to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, to dismiss for failure to state a claim for
relief, and motions for summary judgment, while the plaintiff must meet the
does not literally toll the time for answering, but takes the view that because of the inte-
gration of rules 12 and 56, a summary judgment motion by the defendant should have that
effect. 6 J. MOORE, supra note 437, 56.08 (2d ed. 1971). Contra, Poe v. Cristina Copper
Mines, Inc., 15 F.R.D. 85, 87 (D. Del. 1953) (holding it is a matter of discretion under
rule 6(b) ).
440 See Wyrough & Loser, Inc. v. Delmor Labs., Inc., 376 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1967)
(when district court granted a preliminary injunction after a four-day hearing prior to any
motion or answer by the defendants, defendants waived process objection even though the
defendants subsequently raised it within the 20-day period allowed under rule 12.
4' FED. R. CIv. P. 65(a) (2).
"'See the decision by Judge Weinstein in Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472
(E.D.N.Y. 1968), in which a class action for securities fraud was allowed to proceed upon
sequential stages of proof and discovery by the plaintiffs under the general limitation that
the plaintiffs should not be allowed to proceed with a class action unless they are able to
convince the court that there is a substantial possibility they will prevail on the merits.
Judge Weinstein refers to the process as "controlled discovery" and finds authority for it
in the class action rules, and also by analogy to the requirements of a hearing on a motion
for a preliminary injunction at which the court considers "the likelihood that one party or
the other will prevail at trial." Developments in the Law-Inunctions, 78 HARV. L. REv.
994, 1056 (1965). See also Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (1st Cir. 1972) (discovery
of certain police records allowed to determine existence of class in civil rights suit).
4" FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
"'Id. 43 (e).
"'South Hill Neighborhood Ass'n, Inc. v. Romney (E.D. Ky., Nov. 1969), reported
and afl'd per curiam in 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1025 (1970).
446 This route was more legitimate procedurally than the alternative of simply granting
the motion to dismiss outright, and, of course, gave the trial judge's decision more protec-
tion from appellate review.
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burden of showing facts that demonstrate irreparable injury and a likelihood
that he will prevail on the merits." ' If the plaintiff's motions for discovery
are subordinated to the defendant's motions, or if his subpoenas are quashed,
the plaintiff will have a difficult time coming up with facts to meet the stan-
dards, unless he has been able to have the assistance of organized fact gathering
about the defendant's practices. Assuming, however, that the judge moves on
into some kind of full hearing after "controlled discovery,""' 8 whether he
grants or denies the injunction, he is obliged to set forth his findings of fact
and conclusions of law."9 His findings of fact will then be set aside only if
"clearly erroneous," ' and since the injunction lies within his sound discretion,
his decision will not be lightly overturned.4" Provided that the trial judge now
holds some sort of factual hearing and carefully copies the language from
Younger, there will probably be a period of benign neglect in which any de-
cision denying relief by the trial judge will be sustained.4"
Although under the Younger sextet the lower federal courts will be sorely
tempted to dispatch plaintiffs' claims out of the federal courts without time-
consuming inquiry into the facts, it is submitted that the Supreme Court's de-
cisions on standing provide precedent for requiring factual hearings. In Bar-
low v. Collins" and Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc.
v. Camp' Justice Brennan emphasized that one reason for moving from the
"legal interest" test to "injury in fact" was to get away from the legalisms under
which plaintiffs are thrown out on the pleadings without having an opportunity
for some factual development before the court. Standing, in other words, is
a question of the merits, which should be decided upon development of the
law and the facts. Significantly, Justice Blackmun expresses a similar approach
in his dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton.' The majority held that the Sierra
Club had not adequately pleaded standing, and affirmed a reversal of a pre-
liminary injunction against the development of the Mineral King Valley. Al-
though the majority indicated that the Sierra Club could amend on remand,
Justice Blackmun argued that the amendment should be allowed at the appel-
late level, and the merits reached, since reversal of the injunction would shift
the equities on the question of the propriety of an injunction. Similarly, the
principle that the plaintiff must show bad-faith enforcement, harassment, or
vagueness and overbreadth in some unknown degree as a matter of substantive
"'Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994 (1965).
44 See note 442 supra.
"4 FED. R. Civ. P. 52. If the motion is considered as one for summary judgment, how-
ever, or as a motion to dismiss, no findings are necessary under rule 52 (a). But see note 456
infra.
430 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
4"7 J. MOORE, supra note 437, 5 65.04[2] (2d ed. 1971).
4" The analogy of pendent jurisdiction comes to mind. While Hurn v. Oursler, 289
U.S. 238 (1933), posed the issue as an abstract question of law, fully reviewable, the later
case of UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), indicates that pendent jurisdiction is in
large part a matter of trial judges' discretion, considering all the various factors of judicial
economy and convenience in relation to the course of proceedings in determining the federal
claim.
45397 U.S. 159 (1970).
4 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
41540 U.S.L.W. 4397 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1972). It is noteworthy that in this case Justice
Blackmun joined with Justice Douglas in dissent, while Chief Justice Burger, Justices Bren-
nan, White, and Marshall joined in Justice Stewart's majority opinion.
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law under the Younger sextet does not mean that he should be thrown out of
federal court prior to an opportunity to develop the facts upon which that de-
cision should be made.'
Justice Burger, however, may tend to disagree, because one of his announced
preferred goals is sound judicial administration, which easily translates into
the objective of cleaning up the federal court dockets, especially the three-judge
court cases. An important question in this respect is whether defenses such as
the lack of grounds for equitable relief, section 2283, abstention, and exhaus-
tion of state remedies may be used to refuse to impanel three-judge courts,
and thus reduce the burden of the direct appeal docket of the Supreme Court.
In Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein the Supreme Court limited the
inquiry of a single district judge in such a situation to a determination of
whether "the complaint at least formally alleges a basis for equitable relief,
and whether the case presented otherwise comes within the requirements of the
three-judge statute.""7 However, because single district judges may and do con-
sider matters outside the pleadings at this stage, there is a temptation for them
to pierce the plaintiff's formal allegations of great and immediate irreparable
injury and refuse to convene a three-judge court on the basis that the injunction
question "could not possibly go in any manner save one.' 8 Thus, in addition
to determining the substantiality of the federal question,' 9 the single district
judge now may determine whether any factual basis for equitable relief exists.
In several cases single district judges have in this manner refused to impanel
three-judge courts"' in spite of the fact that the single-judge inquiry "is tra-
ditionally limited to the face of the complaint and does not involve the single
judge in factual determinations related to the merits of the case." 1 The judge
in Pederson v. Breier explained his view that single judges have a duty to de-
termine whether both substantiality and a basis for equitable relief exist:
[Wlhere it clearly appears from the facts and allegations in a record developed
up to the point of deciding whether to convene a statutory court that the basis
for equitable relief is wholly lacking, I believe I have a duty to refuse to con-
"
6 See Carter v. Stanton, 40 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S. Apr. 3, 1972), reversing per curiam
the dismissal of a three-judge court challenge to an Indiana welfare regulation because the
lower court improperly required exhaustion of state remedies, failed to appreciate the sub-
stantiality of the complaint, and failed to articulate the law and the factual basis for its
judgment, if in fact it was a summary judgment.
There is also support for the proposition that the federal court should hold adequate
factual hearings in the trend to allow standing to defeated government bidders. See Scan-
well Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Thus, the fact that defeated
bidders are now given standing does not mean that they win relief; it merely means they
have a right to a judicial proceeding to determine whether, upon the facts and the law,
some sort of relief ought to be accorded them. See Comment, Judicial Review for Disap-
pointed Bidders on Federal Government Contracts, p. 384 in ra.
7 370 U.S. 713, 715 (1962).
"' Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vincent, 375 F.2d 129, 131 n.1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 839 (1967).
"'Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933).
'"See Hammond v. Brown, 450 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1971); Pederson v. Breier, 327
F. Supp. 1382 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Alga Inc. v. Crosland, 327 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Ala.
1971); Schellenberger v. Breier, 327 F. Supp. 890 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Marseo v. Cannon,
326 F. Supp. 1315 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Veen v. Davis, 326 F. Supp. 116 (C.D. Cal. 1971);
Hendricks v. Hogan, 324 F. Supp. 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
411 Pederson v. Breier, 327 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 n.3 (E.D. Wis. 1971), citing National
Mobilization Comm. To End War in Viet Nam v. Foran, 411 F.2d 934, 936 (7th Cir.
1969).
[Vol. 26
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
vene a court of three judges. The fact that the plaintiffs have, on the face of
their complaints, alleged 'bad faith' and 'irreparable injury' should not, in my
view, automatically require the convening of three judges to determine if the
allegations have any substance .... If there is no reasonable basis for injunc-
tive relief in a case such as this, I believe the single judge should refuse to
burden the federal judiciary by convening a three-judge court. . . .I believe
that this result in this case comports with the purpose of the three-judge court
statute and the oft-stated requirement that, in light of the burden on the
federal judiciary imposed by three-judge courts, the statute be narrowly
read ... 42
Thus, it appears that a plaintiff may be out of court at an early stage for
lack of facts, or for lack of access to the facts, even though his allegations are
formally sufficient and he presents a substantial federal question. And it is
apparent that refusals to convene three-judge courts on the ground that the
plaintiff has made an inadequate showing of his right to equitable relief will
become increasingly prevalent-possibly surpassing lack of substantiality as
a popular merit-avoidance device in three-judge court cases. But the Younger
decisions should not, and were not intended, to deny plaintiffs the right to a
hearing on their claims in federal courts; they should only limit the grounds
upon which they can obtain various kinds of relief. In other words, the Supreme
Court has told the lower federal courts to say "yes" less often-but it has not
told them to stop listening.
VI. CONCLUSION
A number of different conclusions may be drawn about the Younger sextet.
Professor Charles A. Wright calls them "the most important development in
the law of Federal Courts in many years."4 ' Most writers will analyze them
within the traditional principles of federalism,' while others will use these
cases to chart the value matrices of the individual Justices on the variety of
substantive constitutional issues that are evoked."' Others may see the Younger
cases in their specific factual context as a political reaction of the judicial "es-
tablishment" against "advocates of social change" and their "movement" law-
yers.' Under this view even if the federal plaintiffs foresee ultimate denial of
relief in federal court, they may still seek it in order to gain the psychology of
counterattack against state officials, the possibility of stays pending review,
inducement to compromise, and the use of the federal court as a forum for
protest." ' Given this attitude, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court re-
acted to the plaintiffs' claims as it did in the Younger cases. There is now danger
462 Id.
463 WRIGHT 3 (1972 Supp.).
464 See Brewer, Dombrowski v. Pfister: Federal Injunctions Against State Prosecutions
in Civil Rights Cases-A New Trend in Federal-State Judicial Relations, 34 FORD. L. REV.
71 (1965); Boyer, Federal Injunctive Relief: A Counterpoise Against the Use of State
Criminal Prosecutions Designed To Deter the Exercise of Preferred Constitutional Rights,
13 How. L.J. 51 (1967); Dickson, Declaratory Remedies and Constitutional Change, 24
VAND. L. REV. 257 (1971); Maraist, supra note 7.
4"See G. SCHUBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS (1960).
' See Sedler, Dombrowski in the Wake of Younger: The View From Without and
Within, 1972 WIs. L. REV. 1.
"'Id. at 7-12, 57, 58.
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that this new spirit of denying federal injunctive relief in pending state criminal
proceedings will spread to other types of demands for federal relief against
state law. The momentum having been set in motion, it may be too much to
expect that federal courts will not misuse the related principles of exhaustion of
state remedies, abstention, and comity in a variety of cases in which federal
relief would otherwise be appropriate.
Grounds for optimism can be found, however, in the discriminating reading
that the Younger opinions are being given in the lower courts and the pattern
of law that is emerging. Thus, it is hoped that adequate factual inquiry will
continue to be made,' that the potential use of the declaratory judgment will
be developed, "' that the prohibition of section 2283 will be avoided, and that
Younger will not become an all-purpose tool for abstention.!"
There are also good reasons for limiting the Younger sextet to injunctions of
criminal proceedings."7' One reason for making the distinction is that state crim-
inal convictions based upon unconstitutional statutes or proceedings can sub-
sequently be challenged in lower federal courts on writs of habeas corpus."
If this were not so, convicted state defendants claiming federal constitutional
rights would have only a mirage of protection, since their claims must strenu-
ously compete with other cases in the United States Supreme Court. 8 Habeas
corpus, in other words, creates a lower federal court appellate review system
over state supreme courts to consider a number of cases that the Supreme Court
might not otherwise handle. So long as this habeas corpus jurisdiction remains
intact, the Younger cases have not totally removed an effective federal forum
for constitutional rights in ordering the federal courts to withhold injunctive
remedies prior to trial."4 But the remedies are different in state civil cases. In
theory, at least, the remedy for constitutional challenges in civil proceedings
in the state court is to appeal up through the state system to the United States
Supreme Court. If initiation of the state court proceeding cannot be prevented,
later attempts to shift in midstream to the federal court have traditionally been
met with pleas of res judicataY Thus, theoretically there is less federal forum
review in state civil proceedings than in criminal proceedings.
In this context an important question arises whether section 1983 can be
used in civil cases to attack state supreme court decisions in lower federal
courts. Ultimately, a justification for allowing such attacks and review would be
that statistically the chances for Supreme Court review of a state court decision
are so limited that unless the lower federal courts provide a forum for review
through this device the United States Constitution has become effectively
meaningless--except to the extent that the state judges choose to comply with
4" See text accompanying notes 309-11 supra.
419 See text accompanying notes 389-98 supra.
470See text accompanying notes 413-20 supra.
41 See text accompanying notes 266-78 supra.
47228 U.S.C. S 2254 (1970).
4 3 See Gressman, Much Ado About Certiorari, 52 GEo. L.J. 742 (1964).
474 However, the trend may also be toward narrowing federal habeas corpus by expand-
ing the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270
(1971).475 See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
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it.4 In Mack v. Florida State Board of Dentistry.. the plaintiff, Mack, whose
dentistry license had been removed by an administrative board, sought and was
denied relief by the Florida state courts. Mack then brought an original action
under section 1983 in federal district court on the grounds that he was not
given a hearing consistent with due process under the fourteenth amendment.
The district court, and, ultimately, the Fifth Circuit, ordered the Board to
reinstate Mack's license unless within sixty days the Board conducted a lawful
hearing. A petition for certiorari by the Board was denied," but it is note-
worthy that Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice, took the trouble to
dissent from the denial on the grounds that because Mack first sought relief
in the state court, the question was res judicata, and that Mack's only federal
remedy should have been to seek certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court to review the state court decision: "Whether § 1983 is to serve as the
analogue to habeas corpus in civil cases displacing the usual rules of finality
seems an important and timely issue having serious state-federal implica-
tions.... Accordingly, I dissent from the denial of certiorari in this case. '
Commentators on the overall performance of the Burger Court may miss
the point if they focus on its substantive constitutional law decisions. Far more
important are its decisions like Younger narrowing the jurisdiction of the
federal district courts. The "delicate balance of federalism" is the familiar
justification, but quietly a new invocation has pushed to the forefront: the
need for "sound judicial administration." Philip B. Kurland, as an admirer of
Justice Frankfurter, is certainly no flaming advocate of federal judicial power."
Nevertheless, Kurland is alarmed that Chief Justice Burger has taken on a
roving nonjudicial commission to dry up the court dockets." Certainly, if new
demands for federal intervention are perceived as a floodburst, the immediate
response is to turn off the valves. Now that the emergency call has gone out
and the plumbers are banging around in the pipes, we must trust that the
plumbers intend not to shut off the water permanently, but only to restore its
regular and orderly flow.
'" Although it would require some amount of statistical study, it might be safe to say
that since 1871, realistic access to the Supreme Court for review of state court decisions
in terms of statistical probability has been on a decreasing trend line by virtue of constantly
increasing caseload. But see Gressman, note 473 supra. If such access has in fact decreased,
then to maintain the balance of federalism as it was struck after the Civil War, the lower
federal courts should take up the slack and provide an effective forum for the protection
of federal constitutional rights denied or ignored by state courts. See H. HART & H. WEcH-
SLER, supra note 16, at 37, 885; THE FEDERALisT No. 82, at 609-10 (J. Hamilton ed.
1880) (A. Hamilton). If section 1983 were thus to become an analogue to habeas corpus,
the justification for federal intervention prior to initiation of state civil proceedings would
be diminished, and Younger's principles might come to govern both civil and criminal
cases.
47430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970).
471401 U.S. 960 (1971).
447Id. at 961-62.
4OSee Rodell, Book Review, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 949 (1971).
4" Kurland, The Lord Chancellor of the United States, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1971, at 11.
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